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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Imagine that you love to do Latin dancing. You think that you are 
very good at it and you participate in a dance competition where 
all the top dancers are present. But then it happens: you make a 
silly mistake and you fall over. You have the feeling that everybody 
is watching you and that you made a complete fool of yourself.  
 
Now imagine that a good friend tells you about his important 
dance competition. He knows you are a very good Latin dancer, 
and therefore he asks you to be his partner for that competition. 
However, during the competition you make a mistake and you 
make your friend fall over. Your friend ends last in the competition 
and you can see he is very sad.  
 
In situations such as these, people often experience emotions 
such as shame over having made a silly mistake or guilt over 
having hurt a friend. Emotions play an important role in daily life 
and influence what we feel, what we think, and what we do. They 
have an effect on the decisions we make, for example whether we 
would enter another dance competition after our fall or whether we 
would apologize after having failed our friend. For a long time, 
emotions were perceived as unstable phenomena that influence 
behavior in unpredictable ways, and therefore not to be taken into 
account in decision making research. Nowadays, it more and more 
appears that emotions are stable phenomena which behave 
lawfully (Frijda, 1986, 2006). This means that emotions influence 
behavior in systematic and predictable ways, which offers the 
opportunity not only to study what emotions are, but also to study 
how emotions affect decision making. One such important area in 
decision making is social behavior. Many scholars, especially 
economists, have often wondered why people act prosocially 
towards other people and cooperate in daily interactions. Emotions 
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might play a large role in social behavior and this dissertation tries 
to shed light on why and when people act prosocially by focusing 
on two highly interpersonal emotions: shame and guilt. As will 
become clear later on, many scholars have theorized about what 
shame and guilt are and when these emotions arise (e.g., Gilbert 
& Andrews, 1998; H. B. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995), but it is unclear how 
these emotions affect behavior. This dissertation aims to 
contribute to the understanding of shame and guilt in particular 
and to the understanding of the role of emotions in social behavior 
in general by taking a good look at what emotions are and by 
subsequently empirically study the behaviors following from 
shame and guilt. 
 
 
What are Emotions? 
 
There has been a lot of debate among psychologists, 
philosophers, and other scholars about what emotions are. 
Emotions are complex phenomena, and there is no single 
characteristic that defines when a phenomenon is an emotion 
(Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981). Currently, however, scholars do 
agree on some aspects of emotions. Emotions are thought to arise 
after an evaluation (an appraisal) of an event as positively or 
negatively relevant to one’s goals or concerns (Frijda, 1986). They 
are about something or someone, and are acute and relatively 
momentary experiences. This aspect denotes the difference 
between emotions and moods, since moods are not directed 
towards an object and are more enduring and less intense than an 
emotion (Parrott, 2001a).  
 
The appraisal, or the process of judging the significance of an 
event for personal well-being, not only determines whether an 
emotion is felt, but also which specific emotion is experienced. A 
specific pattern of cognitive appraisals of the emotion-eliciting 
situation gives rise to a specific emotion (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 
1988; C. Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Different people can have 
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different patterns of cognitive appraisals in a situation, but the 
same pattern of appraisals gives rise to the same emotion. The 
appraisal pattern is an important element of an emotion, because 
it tells us why a specific emotion arises and thus provides the base 
for understanding why emotions motivate certain behaviors. 
 
Next to appraisals, emotions also contain feelings, thoughts, 
emotivational goals, action tendencies, and actions (Roseman, 
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Feelings, which are physical or mental 
sensations, and thoughts, which are ideas, plans, conceptions, or 
opinions produced by mental activity, concern the experience of 
the emotion itself. Instead, emotivational goals, action tendencies, 
and actions are the elements of an emotion that mobilize people to 
undertake action. Every discrete emotion contains a general goal, 
such as avoiding danger when feeling fear or taking revenge when 
feeling angry. The general goal is labelled the emotivational goal 
by Roseman (1984) and pattern of action readiness by Frijda 
(1986, 2006). The emotivational goal translates into an inclination 
to respond with a particular action (the action tendency), and 
finally, when it is possible in the situation, an action will follow.  
 
 
Specific Emotions in Decision Making 
 
In general, emotions can be divided into two groups on the basis 
of their valence: negative emotions and positive emotions. The 
valence approach has stimulated much research focusing on the 
different behavioral effects of negative and positive emotions. 
Even though this approach can be very interesting, it overlooks the 
fact that specific emotions have specific goals and thus can 
motivate different behaviors. Consequently, different emotions with 
the same valence will probably motivate different behaviors. For 
example, researchers have found contrasting behaviors following 
anger and fear (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), or following regret and 
disappointment (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999). Thus it seems that a 
focus on specific emotions will give more insight into the 
influences of emotions on behavior than a mere valence approach. 
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For this reason, I will adopt an approach based on specific 
emotions, namely the feeling-is-for-doing approach. 
 
The feeling-is-for-doing approach (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, & 
Pieters, 2007; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006) views emotions as 
motivational processes that are instrumental to the goal one is 
striving for. In the case of negative emotions, when a concern of a 
person is threatened, the emotion arises to signal this problem and 
then motivates behavior to close the gap between the present 
situation and the goal. Because different problems need different 
solutions, different emotions will arise and they will motivate 
different behaviors. The behavior depends on the accessibility and 
acceptability in that situation, and on the instrumentality to the 
overarching goal.  
 
Importantly, the feeling-is-for-doing approach not only makes a 
distinction between different emotions, but also between 
endogenous and exogenous influences of emotions (Zeelenberg, 
Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2006). Emotions can influence behavior while they are related to 
the current goal (endogenous influences), but also while they are 
actually unrelated to the current goal (exogenous influences). The 
endogenous influence of an emotion is an integral part of the goal 
setting and the goal striving process and thus relevant for the 
decision at hand. This happens, for example, when feelings of guilt 
after having made your friend fall down motivate you to put all your 
effort into making the best of the remainder of the dance 
competition. The second influence, an exogenous influence of an 
emotion, is external to the goal setting and goal striving process 
and is not related to current decisions. This occurs, for example, 
when feelings of shame for having fallen over in the dance 
competition motivate you to act harshly towards people on the 
train back home. Most research on behavioral effects of emotions 
tend to ignore the distinction between exogenous and endogenous 
influences and study only exogenous influences. These studies 
give us many interesting insights in spill-over effects of emotions 
and show us how emotions influence behaviors in ways that 
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should logically not occur. However, the results of exogenous 
influences can not always be used to interpret the function of an 
emotion, because these effects may be influenced by the 
changing surrounding. In contrast, endogenous influences of an 
emotion show us what the emotion signals to the decision maker 
and therefore do give insights in the function of an emotion. 
Importantly, exogenous and endogenous influences of a single 
emotion may give rise to completely different behaviors. When one 
is not aware of these distinct influences, such different behaviors 
may result in diverse understandings of the same emotion. As will 
become apparent in later chapters, this is especially the case with 
shame and guilt.  
 
 
Shame and Guilt: Two Moral Emotions 
 
Shame and guilt both belong to the group of moral emotions. 
Moral emotions are emotions that are linked to the well-being of 
others and of society as a whole (Haidt, 2003). According to the 
economist Smith (1759), these emotions motivate people to do 
what is morally appropriate, even though this can be contrary to 
one’s immediate economic self-interest. As Frank (1988, 2004) 
explains, when people are in a situation in which immediate self-
interests conflict with long-term cooperation, moral emotions offer 
a solution. As soon as people choose (or imagine choosing) for 
self-interest, they will experience negative moral emotions such as 
shame and guilt. As a consequence, the self-interest option 
becomes less attractive, stimulating people to choose the 
prosocial, long-term option. The prosocial option is not only 
beneficial for others and for society, it also benefits people 
themselves by making future collaborations more probable and by 
avoiding punishments from others for acting selfishly. In summary, 
moral emotions act as commitment devices, stimulating prosocial 
behavior and committing people to options that are best for the 
society and for themselves in the long run.  
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What Do We Know About Shame? 
 
In emotion research, most scholars perceive shame to be “one of 
the most powerful, painful, and potentially destructive experiences 
known to humans” (Gilbert, 1997, p. 113). Shame arises after a 
moral transgression or incompetence, in which people perceive 
the self to have violated a moral or social standard (Fessler, 2004; 
Keltner & Buswell, 1996). The behavior generalizes to the whole 
self-image, and as consequence people have a heightened 
degree of self-awareness or self-consciousness and think the 
whole self is fundamentally flawed (Izard, 1977; H. B. Lewis, 1971; 
Sabini & Silver, 1997). For example, after your fall at the dance 
competition, you would probably have the feeling that you are a 
terrible Latin dancer and that you can’t do anything right. Besides 
that, people are often consciously aware of others around and 
focus on others’ actual or imagined negative evaluations (Fessler, 
2004; Haidt, 2003; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Thus, you would 
likely be worried about what all the top dancers and the audience 
of the dance competition will think of you. During a shame 
experience, people often feel small, alone, powerless, helpless, 
and inferior to others (Fontaine et al., 2006; Nathanson, 1992; 
Tangney, 1995, 1999). The feeling expresses itself in the bodily 
posture: when experiencing shame, the body is often collapsed 
with the shoulders falling in, a downward lip, and lowered eyes 
with the gaze downwards (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; M. Lewis, 
2003).  
 
According to shame theories, shame has negative influences on 
behavior. Shame would make speech, movement, and action 
more difficult and less likely (Gilbert, 1997). It is thought to be 
related to submission and would motivate social avoidance, 
withdrawal, rejection and disengagement from others (Dickerson & 
Gruenewald, 2004; M. Lewis, 2003; Probyn, 2004; Tangney, 1991, 
1995; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007a). After having 
conducted much theoretical and empirical research on shame and 
guilt, Tangney (1999) states that shame motivates behaviors that 
“are likely to sever or interfere with interpersonal relationships”. 
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These submissive and withdrawal behaviors function as a form of 
appeasement, signaling to others that people are aware of their 
norm-violating behavior and will not fight back but will conform to 
the group standards (Gilbert, 1997; Izard, 1977; Mills, 2005; 
Nathanson, 1987). So, shame theories would predict that, after 
having fallen over in the dance competition, you would most likely 
leave the dance floor immediately without looking at anyone, 
change clothes, and go home. Overall, the picture that emerges 
from shame literature is that there is little positive about shame. 
 
 
What Do We Know About Guilt? 
 
The picture that emerges from emotion literature for guilt is much 
more positive than that for shame. Guilt is thought to arise after a 
moral transgression in which one has hurt, intentionally or 
unintentionally, another person (Fessler & Haley, 2003; Izard, 
1977; Tangney, 1991). The most common category of causes of 
guilt are neglecting partners in close relationships and failing to 
live up to commitments or obligations to others (Baumeister, Reis, 
& Delespaul, 1995). As a consequence, people are completely 
focused on the harm and distress that they have caused to the 
other person (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; H. B. 
Lewis, 1987). For example, after having made your friend fall over 
in the dance competition, you would probably only think about 
what you have done to your friend. After the transgression, people 
often feel tense, remorseful, worried and less competent 
(Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; H. B. Lewis, 1971). There is 
no known bodily expression for guilt. 
 
In contrast with shame, most theories state that guilt has positive 
influences on behavior. Guilt would be linked to better perspective 
taking and feelings of empathy (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; 
Tangney & Dearing, 2002). It is thought to motivate a desire to 
compensate the victim, and actions to repair the hurt caused, to 
make amends, or to apologize (Caplovitz Barrett, 1995; Lindsay-
Hartz, 1984; Thrane, 1979). The function is to preserve and 
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strengthen the hurt relationship by making up past the past 
transgression and stimulating more appropriate behavior in the 
future (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Baumeister et al., 
1994). So, guilt theories would predict that, after having made your 
friend fall down, you would probably do your utmost best during 
the remainder of the competition, or would treat your friend to a 
dinner and cinema afterwards.  
 
 
Behaviors Following from Shame and Guilt 
 
When we summarize the theories discussed previously, it seems 
easy to predict what people do when they experience shame or 
guilt. Nothing is further from the truth. Different theories give 
different predictions about what behaviors shame and guilt 
motivate, and research conducted on consequences of shame and 
guilt has yielded contrasting results. On the one hand, theories 
about moral emotions state that both shame and guilt are moral 
emotions and thus that both motivate prosocial behavior. On the 
other hand, emotion theories state that shame motivates 
avoidance and withdrawal behaviors and that guilt motivates 
reparative actions toward the hurt other. Especially for shame, 
these are contrasting behaviors and it seems very unlikely, if not 
impossible, that a single emotion can motivate both.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no empirical research that can give an 
answer to the question what behaviors shame and guilt motivate. I 
am not aware of any studies that have measured actual behavior 
following from shame and there are only two studies that have 
measured behavioral effects of guilt. The important first step was 
made by Ketelaar and Au (2003), who found that, after recalling a 
situation in which they experienced guilt, people acted more 
prosocially in social dilemma game. In a second study, the 
researchers showed that people acted more prosocially in a 
dilemma game after making an unfair offer in an earlier round of 
the game. Nelissen, Dijker, and De Vries (2007) added to these 
findings by focusing on effects of guilt and fear, showing that 
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people acted more prosocially towards an unknown other in a 
social dilemma game after remembering a situation in which they 
experienced guilt but not after remembering a fear experience. 
Like in the first study of Ketelaar and Au, the influence of guilt in 
the study of Nelissen et al. is an exogenous influence because the 
remembered guilt situation was unrelated to the social dilemma 
game. The findings of Ketelaar and Au and of Nelissen et al. 
suggest that, in a dyadic situation with a person not related to the 
guilt feelings, guilt motivates prosocial behavior as a spill-over 
effect. 
 
Next to these two behavioral studies, a limited set of studies has 
focused on the consequences of shame and guilt without 
measuring behavior. A part of these studies has focused on action 
tendencies following shame and guilt (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter 
Schure, 1989; Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & 
Barlow, 1996; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). In these studies 
participants were asked to recall a situation in which they had 
experienced shame or guilt. After this autobiographical recall 
induction, participants rated on different items what they felt, what 
they thought, and what they wanted to do after the described 
situation. Even though these studies used the same method, the 
results contradicted each other, even sometimes within a single 
study. For example, Wicker et al. (1983) and Roseman et al. 
(1994) found that shame was not related to an action, while 
Tangney et al. (1996) and Frijda et al. (1989) found that shame 
activated both a desire to disappear from view and a desire to 
undo the action or to make amends. For guilt, some scholars 
found that guilt was not related to an action (Frijda et al., 1989; 
Wicker et al., 1983), while other scholars found that guilt motivated 
a tendency to make up for one’s misdeeds and to make amends 
(Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996). These contrasting 
findings make it difficult to draw definite conclusions about what 
actions and action tendencies follow from shame and guilt.  
 
Another part of studies has focused on consequences of shame 
and guilt proneness instead of situational experiences of shame 
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and guilt. Shame-proneness and guilt-proneness are the general 
tendencies of a person to experience shame or guilt (Tangney, 
1990), and have mostly been measured with a personality scale 
called TOSCA, the Test Of Self-Conscious Affect (Tangney, 
Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989). Studies using this scale have given 
us interesting insights, showing for example that people who have 
a general tendency to experience shame are prone to feelings of 
anxiety, lessened empathy, shyness, interpersonal distrust, eating 
disorders, posttraumatic stress disorders, and depression (Harder, 
1995; Harder, Cutler, & Rockart, 1992; Mills, 2005; Sanftner, 
Barlow, Marschall, & Tangney, 1995). The question is whether the 
findings with shame and guilt proneness can be generalized to 
situational experiences of shame and guilt. Some scholars have 
simultaneously studied the consequences of shame and guilt 
proneness and of situational experiences of shame and guilt and 
have found different relations with social dysfunction, feelings of 
inferiority, and anger (Rüsch et al., 2007). For example, Allan, 
Gilbert, and Goss (1994) found that shame-proneness was 
strongly related to depression and social dysfunction, while 
situational experiences of shame were related to feelings of 
inferiority and anger at self and others. In addition, there are some 
recent indications that the TOSCA mainly measures adaptive 
aspects of guilt and maladaptive aspects of shame (Ferguson, 
Brugman, White, & Eyre, 2007; Luyten, Fontaine, & Corveleyn, 
2002).  
 
In sum, it is not entirely clear what behaviors follow from shame 
and guilt. Theories predict different, and sometimes contrasting 
behaviors. Empirical research can also not provide an answer, as 
existing studies have only focused on exogenous influences of 
guilt in dyadic situations, or on action tendencies, or on shame and 
guilt proneness. The aim of this dissertation is to fill this gap and to 
empirically study what behaviors shame and guilt motivate. 
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Towards a Better Understanding of Shame and Guilt 
 
In this dissertation I will try to gain a better understanding of 
shame and guilt by making use of a pragmatic approach based on 
two elements. First, this dissertation assumes that when one 
wants to know what behaviors follow from a specific emotion, it is 
necessary to take a good look at the elements of the emotion and 
at what the emotion stands for. This means that one needs to 
know what feelings and thoughts people experience with the 
emotion, what emotivational goal the emotion activates, and what 
action tendencies will follow. Second, when one wants to 
understand emotions, it is necessary to take into account the 
emotional influence. Exogenous and endogenous influences may 
activate different behaviors, leading to different conclusions about 
an emotion. When one takes into account the different influences 
and knows what kind of influence is being studied, it is possible to 
gain a better understanding of an emotion. Applying this pragmatic 
approach to shame and guilt, the following images arise.  
 
When we take a good look at shame, it appears that this emotion 
revolves around a threatened self. As described previously, shame 
gives rise to feelings of inferiority and worthlessness, and to 
negative thoughts about the self and about what others would 
think about the self. The failure that gives rise to feelings of shame 
generalizes to the whole self-image, signaling a problem of a 
threatened self. Because people have a fundamental human 
motive to have a positive image of the self, the emotivational goal 
of shame is to deal with the threatened self. The following action 
tendencies depend on the situation and on the emotion influence. I 
suggest that, because people prefer to have a positive self, shame 
first motivates approach behaviors to restore the self, and when 
this is not possible to too risky, it motivates avoidance behaviors to 
protect the self. One way to deal with the threatened self and to 
improve the image people and their audience have would be to act 
prosocially. The prosocial behavior also corresponds with what 
moral emotions theory would predict (Frank, 1988). Because these 
approach behaviors to restore the self reflect the function of 
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shame, prosocial effects are expected to appear when studying 
endogenous influences of shame. In contrast, I do not expect 
approach behaviors following from shame when studying 
exogenous influences. The reasoning is that another way to deal 
with the threatened self would be to leave the threatening shame 
situation. When the influence of shame is exogenous, the situation 
in which the self was threatened is already different from the 
decision situation at hand. As a consequence, people have 
already fulfilled the emotivational goal to deal with the threatened 
self and therefore will not act upon their shame feelings. The 
absence of effects for exogenous influences of shame also 
corresponds with what shame theories would predict (Tangney, 
1991; M. Lewis, 2003)  
 
Taking a closer look at guilt, it becomes clear that this emotion 
revolves around a threatened relationship that needs to be dealt 
with. Guilt gives rise to feelings of remorse and to thoughts about 
the hurt person. It follows that guilt has the emotivational goal to 
improve the hurt relationship. Similar to shame, the following 
action tendencies will depend on the situation and on the emotion 
influence. When the hurt person is present (i.e., endogenous 
influences of guilt), it is possible to repair the damage and guilt will 
motivate prosocial behavior towards the hurt person. However, the 
preoccupation with the hurt person is hypothesized to result in a 
neglect of the well-being of third others. I therefore expect 
endogenous influences of guilt to motivate prosocial behavior 
towards the hurt person at the expense of others around, and not 
at the expense of oneself. In contrast, when the hurt person is not 
present (i.e., exogenous influences of guilt), it is not possible to 
restore the damage. The emotivational goal of improving the hurt 
relationship will then translate into improving relationships in 
general, stimulating actions to avoid damaging other relationships. 
In other words, I expect exogenous influences of guilt to stimulate 
prosocial behavior, convergent with the findings of Ketelaar and 
Au (2003) and Nelissen et al. (2007).  
 
In the following chapters I report studies that were designed to 
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address the question what people do when they experience 
shame or guilt. The four chapters are based on individual papers 
that have either been published or have been submitted for 
publication. Because these papers were written in collaboration 
with colleagues the text refers to “we” when is spoken about the 
authors. The benefit of the individual papers is that each chapter 
can be read separately. The downside is that there may exist 
some overlap between the chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on exogenous influences of shame and guilt in 
dyadic situations. Moral emotions theory predicts that, as two 
moral emotions, both shame and guilt would motivate prosocial 
behavior (Frank, 1988, 2004; Smith, 1759). But focusing on the 
emotion elements of shame and guilt, one would expect only 
prosocial effects of guilt and not of shame. The predictions are 
supported by two studies, showing that exogenous influences of 
guilt motivate prosocial behavior, while exogenous influences of 
shame do not have an effect on prosocial behavior.  
 
Chapter 3 extends the findings of Chapter 2 and concentrates on 
exogenous and endogenous influences of shame. As stated 
previously, exogenous influences of shame are expected to have 
no effect on prosocial behavior, replicating the findings of Chapter 
2. In contrast, endogenous influences of shame are expected to 
reflect the function of shame, and therefore to motivate prosocial 
behavior. Indeed, four studies show that endogenous shame 
motivates prosocial behavior, while exogenous shame has no 
influence on behavior.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses in more detail on the motivations underlying 
shame. Supporting both emotion theories and the theory of moral 
emotions, Chapters 2 and 3 show that shame can motivate 
withdrawal behavior (leaving the threatening situation) but also 
prosocial behavior. These seem to be contrasting behaviors, and 
Chapter 4 examines how a single emotion can motivate such 
contrasting behaviors. Five studies offer support for the suggestion 
that shame has a restore and a protect motive that together 
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predict the behaviors following from shame.  
 
After having concentrated on shame, the focus of Chapter 5 shifts 
back to guilt. Chapter 2 has shown that when reparation is not 
possible, guilt motivates prosocial behavior towards unrelated 
others. Chapter 5 extends these findings by broadening the 
perspective to multiple-person situations. If guilt indeed signals a 
hurt relationship, then all attention would be on the hurt other and 
no attention would be paid to others present. Five studies show 
that, when the hurt other is present and reparation is thus 
possible, guilt motivates prosocial behavior towards the hurt 
person at the expense of third parties and not at the expense of 
oneself. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 integrates the empirical results presented in 
Chapters 2 to 5 and discusses the contributions of this research to 
our understanding of shame and guilt and the consequences for 
the study of emotions in decision making in general. I hope that 
you are by now very curious and will follow me along the exciting 
path of discovering shame and guilt.  
1 This chapter is based on De Hooge, Zeelenberg & Breugelmans (2007)      21 
Chapter 2 
 
 
Moral Sentiments and Cooperation: 
 
Differential Influences of  
 
Shame and Guilt1 
  
 
Most people would agree that the experiences of guilt and shame 
are unpleasant and not something that we would strive for. Still, 
experiences of negative emotions can have positive 
consequences. For centuries economists and psychologists have 
argued that moral emotions such as guilt and shame lead to 
prosocial or cooperative behaviors (Frank, 1988/2004; Ketelaar, 
2004; Smith, 1759). The idea is that when people feel guilty, they 
will try to make up for the harm that they caused. Put differently, 
moral emotions motivate people to act prosocially, which has 
positive consequences for the people around them. However, the 
question is whether these positive effects are present for all moral 
emotions. In this article we argue and show that prosocial effects 
in the short term are found for the moral emotion guilt but not for 
shame, another moral emotion.  
 
 
Moral Emotions and Cooperative Behavior 
 
Moral emotions can be understood as emotions that are linked to 
the interests or welfare of society as a whole or of other people 
(Haidt, 2003). These emotions originate in social relationships and 
are built on reciprocal evaluations and judgments of the self and 
others (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Adam Smith, the founder of 
modern economics, stated as early as 1759 that moral emotions 
motivate cooperation. These emotions lead people to focus on the 
other and on how one’s own behavior affects the other’s well-
being. In situations where there is a conflict between the self-
Chapter 2 
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interest of a person and interest of a group (a social dilemma), 
moral emotions are claimed to motivate people to act in favor of 
other people’s interests (Frank, 1988/2004; Ketelaar, 2004; Smith, 
1759). In this way, moral sentiments motivate cooperative 
behaviors.  
 
Frank (1988/2004) has elaborated on the cooperative effect of 
moral emotions in his commitment theory. People are often 
confronted with situations where they have to choose between 
defection, which rewards the individual in the short run but is 
costly for the group and the individual in the long run, and 
cooperation, which is costly for the individual in the short run but 
beneficial for the group and the individual’s self-interest in the long 
run. People’s selfishness may seduce them to choose the 
attractive immediate reward at the expense of long-term benefits. 
According to Frank (1988/2004), emotions can act as commitment 
devices that help us to resolve these social dilemmas. Choosing 
for immediate individual rewards in a social dilemma situation 
gives rise to negative moral emotions like guilt. These emotions 
make the option of immediate individual rewards less attractive 
than the more effective long-term strategy. In this way moral 
emotions commit people to choose for the long-term strategy or for 
the group’s interest and thus motivate cooperative behaviors.  
 
Only recently Ketelaar and Au (2003) found empirical results that 
are consistent with these claims. They studied the effects of guilt 
on cooperation. Ketelaar and Au hypothesized that guilt would 
increase cooperation especially for people with the general 
tendency to act uncooperatively. These people (hereafter referred 
to as proselfs) would perceive their feelings of guilt as a 
consequence of their negative behavior and use this as 
information about future costs of pursuing an uncooperative 
strategy. This would lead them to act more cooperatively 
compared to proselfs who do not experience guilt. People with the 
general tendency to act cooperatively (hereafter referred to as 
prosocials) would already act cooperatively and thus not use the 
negative feeling state as an inference about their strategy.  
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In their first study, Ketelaar and Au (2003) started with measuring 
the general tendencies to act (un)cooperatively by letting 
participants play 40 rounds of a repeated social dilemma game (on 
the basis of their choices they were classified as proselfs or 
prosocials). After these 40 rounds, an autobiographical recall 
procedure followed, by which feelings of guilt were induced. 
Participants were asked to give a detailed description of a recent 
experience in which they felt very guilty. After writing for 10 
minutes, participants again played the same social dilemma game 
for 40 rounds. Their choices in the first 10 rounds of these 40 
rounds formed the dependent measure of cooperative behavior. 
The results showed that for proselfs feelings of guilt led to more 
cooperative behavior. The induction of guilt had no effect on 
prosocials. In a second study, Ketelaar and Au found similar 
results for naturally occurring guilt in a two-round ultimatum 
bargaining game. Those who felt guilty over an unfair offer in the 
first round were more likely to make a prosocial offer in the second 
round than those who did not feel guilty.  
 
These findings were recently replicated by Nelissen, Dijker, & De 
Vries (2007), who studied the influences of fear and guilt on 
cooperation in a one-shot give-some dilemma game. They 
hypothesized guilt mainly to motivate cooperation for proselfs, as 
prosocials would already have cooperation as chronically 
accessible goal activated in cooperation situations. As 
hypothesized, induction of guilt by an autobiographical recall 
procedure motivated cooperation only for proselfs and not for 
prosocials. Contrary to guilt, the induction of fear decreased 
cooperation for prosocials and not for proselfs.  
 
Taken together, the findings of Ketelaar and Au (2003) and 
Nelissen et al. (2007) show that the moral emotion guilt motivates 
cooperation. The question that is addressed in this chapter is 
whether this effect on cooperative behavior generalizes to other 
another moral emotion: shame. We have reason to expect that 
shame does not produce cooperative tendencies. 
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Shame and Guilt as Two Moral Emotions 
 
The emotion literature assumes that differential emotions have 
differential influences on judgment and behavior (e.g., Izard, 1993; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). Emotions 
can be differentiated in terms of feelings, thoughts, appraisals, 
action tendencies, and actions (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Specific emotions give information about 
specific problems to be dealt with and motivate people to behave 
in ways to solve the problem (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). The 
present study focuses on these motivational influences of specific 
emotions on behavior.  
 
Guilt is an emotion that arises after a moral transgression 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). People experiencing 
guilt have hurt someone with their behavior and perceive 
themselves as a bad person (Lewis, 1971). What follows is the 
tendency to make up for the wrongdoing and to undertake actions 
to minimize the damage caused (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & 
Barlow, 1996). Thus, the motivations that are associated with guilt 
are consistent with the prosocial behaviors observed in the study 
of Ketelaar and Au (2003). As cooperative behaviors are already 
chronically activated in prosocials, the motivational effect of guilt 
on cooperation will primarily be present in the behavior of proselfs 
(Nelissen et al., 2007). 
 
Shame is another moral emotion that is closely related to guilt. 
This emotion arises after a moral transgression or after exposure 
of incompetence (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). The person has 
shown to be inadequate and feels worthless and inferior compared 
to others (Ausubel, 1955; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). 
When experiencing shame, the focus is on the self and the 
general tendency of an ashamed person in the short term is to 
hide or withdraw from the situation (Tangney et al., 1996). The 
differences between guilt and shame can be found in Table 2.1.  
 
The question that is posed here is whether shame also motivates 
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prosocial behavior. We pose this question because shame is 
associated with a focus on the self and a motivation to hide or 
withdraw from the social situation. These motivational tendencies 
are very different from those of guilt (i.e., reparation) and we argue 
that they are not logically related to cooperative behavior. 
Therefore, it is expected that shame will not promote short-term 
cooperation. Such a finding could have important consequences 
for theories about moral emotions and cooperation. Accordingly, 
this finding would contradict the general assumption that moral 
emotions unequivocally motivate prosocial behaviors.  
 
Two experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses about the 
effects of guilt and shame. Social motives were measured with the 
often used Triple Dominance Measure of Social Value 
Orientations (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). In 
both experiments first feelings of shame or of guilt were induced 
 
Table 2.1  
Differences between Guilt and Shame according to Emotion Literature 
 
 
Emotion 
 
Reference 
 
 
Guilt 
 
Shame 
 
 
Eliciting  
event 
Moral 
transgression 
 
Moral 
transgression or 
incompetence 
 
(Baumeister et al., 
1994; Keltner & 
Buswell, 1996) 
Appraisal Done damage 
 
Center of 
attention 
 
(Lewis, 1971; 
Tangney, 1991) 
Self-
experience 
Bad person Weak person 
 
(Lewis, 1971; Tangney 
& Fischer, 1995) 
Action 
tendency 
Make up for 
wrongdoing 
Hide/withdraw 
 
(Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; 
Tangney et al., 1996) 
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using an autobiographical recall procedure, similar to that of 
Ketelaar and Au (2003). After this manipulation, participants in 
Experiment 2.1 played a dyadic social dilemma game. They 
decided to what extent they would act cooperatively when 
interacting with another person. In Experiment 2.2, cooperation 
was assessed by means of a newly developed prosocial 
tendencies scale. In both experiments we expected and found guilt 
to increase cooperative behavior, especially for proselfs, as was 
found by Ketelaar and Au (2003). For shame, we expected and 
found no effect on cooperation.  
 
 
Experiment 2.1 
 
Method 
 
Participants. Undergraduate economics and psychology students 
at Tilburg University (66 males and 76 females, Mage = 20, SD = 
1.89) participated in this study in partial fulfillment of a course 
requirement. The study had a 3 (Emotion condition: Control vs. 
Guilt vs. Shame) × 2 (SVO: Prosocial vs. Proself) between 
subjects-factorial design with cooperation in a one-shot social 
dilemma game as dependent variable. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the three emotion conditions. Originally, 142 
students participated in this study, but 16 participants who could 
not be classified as prosocial or proself were therefore left out of 
the analyses. In studies using this measure of social motives it is 
common that 10% - 20% of the participants are unclassifiable 
(Nelissen et al., 2007; Van Lange & Visser, 1999). Seventy one 
percent of the males and 52% of the females were proselfs. 
 
Procedure and Variables. Participants entered the laboratory in 
groups of eight to twelve participants. They were seated in 
separate cubicles and informed that the hour consisted of multiple, 
unrelated studies. All the tasks were unrelated and we were 
interested in whether emotion induction in one task would 
influence cooperation in a subsequent unrelated task. The studies 
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consisted of computer tasks and paper-and-pencil tasks and were 
all in Dutch. First, participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire that was placed next to the computer. This 
questionnaire was the emotion induction manipulation and was 
adopted from Ketelaar and Au (2003). The Dutch emotion words 
“schuld” and “schaamte” were used for the English emotion words 
“guilt” and “shame.” Previous cross-cultural research showed that 
these words in both languages refer to similar emotion 
experiences, emotion elements and feelings (Breugelmans & 
Poortinga, 2006; Fontaine et al., 2006). In the Guilt condition, 
participants were asked to report a personal experience in which 
they felt very guilty. Participants wrote for example about cheating 
on their romantic partner, forgetting a friend’s birthday, breaking 
valuable things of others and other related behaviors. In the 
Shame condition, participants were asked to report a personal 
experience in which they felt very ashamed. For example, they 
wrote about bad performance in sports, giving a bad presentation, 
or failing an exam. In the Control condition, participants were 
asked to describe a regular weekday. Participants worked 
approximately 10 minutes on this emotion induction task.  
 
Next, participants continued with an unrelated cooperation game, 
which was the dependent measure. Participants played, via the 
computer, a ten-coin give-some dilemma game with another 
participant (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). At the beginning of the 
game the participants had ten coins, each worth ?0.50 for the 
participant but ?1 for the interaction partner. The interaction 
partners also had ten coins, each worth ?0.50 for themselves but 
?1 for the participant. The participant decided how many coins to 
give to the interaction partner, without knowing how many coins 
the interaction partner would give. In this game, participants would 
earn most together when both offered all coins to the interaction 
partner (the cooperative option). In contrast, the participants 
themselves would earn most when keeping all their coins to 
themselves (the selfish option). The number of coins offered was 
the measure of cooperation.  
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After the game ended participants continued with a third task. 
Here they were asked to go back to the first questionnaire and to 
reread the description they provided in the first task (the emotion 
induction task). To check if the emotion manipulation worked 
properly, participants subsequently indicated how much shame 
and guilt they felt in the described situation. Because one could 
experience a number of different emotions in these situations, 
participants were also asked to indicate how much regret, 
disappointment, sadness, fear, anger at self, anger at others, and 
dissatisfaction they felt in the situation. All emotions were rated on 
11-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly).  
 
The task including the manipulation checks was followed by 
multiple, unrelated computer tasks and paper-and-pencil studies. 
At the end of the hour, participants’ social value orientation (SVO) 
was assessed via the Triple Dominance Measure (Van Lange et 
al., 1997). Usually, two types of SVO are distinguished: prosocials 
(who maximize joint gain and strive for equality) and proselfs (who 
maximize their own outcome). Participants were classified as 
prosocials (n = 49) or proselfs (n = 77) based on at least six (out of 
nine) consistent choices. Importantly, the proself/prosocial 
classification was unaffected by the emotion induction, ?²(2, N = 
126) = 0.56, ns. After completion of all tasks participants were 
thanked and debriefed.  
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Checks. Results of both the manipulation checks and 
cooperation are displayed in Table 2.2. The manipulation checks 
and cooperation are displayed in Table 2.2. The manipulation 
checks showed that the emotion induction was successful. 
Participants in the Guilt condition reported significantly more guilt 
than participants in the Shame condition, t(85) = 5.37, p < .001, 
and participants in the Control condition, t(79) = 14.27, p < .001. 
Participants in the Shame condition reported significantly more 
shame than participants in the Guilt condition, t(85) = 3.77, p < 
.001, and participants in the Control condition, t(82) = 26.94, p < 
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Table 2.2  
Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses of Experienced Emotion and 
Cooperation in Experiment 2.1 
 
 
Emotion Condition 
 
 
Control 
(n=39) 
M    (SD) 
 
Guilt  
(n=42) 
M    (SD) 
 
Shame 
(n=45) 
M    (SD) 
Experienced Emotion    
Guilt 1.87 (1.89) 8.60 (1.53) 5.38 (3.59) 
Prosocial 1.91 (2.35) 8.65 (1.39) 5.12 (3.84) 
Proself 1.81 (3.02) 8.55 (1.68) 5.74 (3.28) 
Shame 1.10 (1.43) 7.57 (1.89) 8.84 (1.21) 
Prosocial 1.30 (1.49) 7.60 (1.70) 9.00 (1.20) 
Proself 0.81 (1.33) 7.55 (2.09) 8.63 (1.21) 
Cooperation    
Prosocials 5.24 (3.70) 4.93 (3.20) 5.53 (2.27) 
Proselfs 3.41 (3.94) 6.04 (3.04) 3.04 (3.31) 
Note. Shame and guilt were measured on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (not 
at all) to 10 (very strongly). Cooperation reflects the number of coins (out of 10) 
that the participant donated to the other person in the dyad. A higher score 
signifies higher cooperation. 
 
.001. Furthermore, participants in the Guilt condition felt more 
guilty than ashamed, t(41) = 4.97, p < .001, and participants in the 
Shame condition felt more ashamed than guilty, t(44) = 6.47, p < 
.001. There were no differences between the Guilt and Shame 
conditions on the other emotions assessed (all ts(85) < 1.76). The 
emotion manipulation worked for both proselfs and prosocials, as 
all reported tests were also significant for prosocials and proselfs.  
 
Cooperation. Two hypotheses were tested. First, guilt was 
hypothesized to increase cooperation especially for proselfs, 
replicating the findings of Ketelaar and Au (2003). Participants in 
the Guilt condition (especially proselfs) were expected to 
contribute more to the other person than participants in the Control 
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condition. Second, shame was hypothesized to have no effect on 
cooperation. Participants in the Shame condition were expected to 
contribute the same amount of coins as participants in the Control 
condition. 
 
The findings supported our hypotheses. A 3 (Emotion condition) × 
2 (SVO) ANOVA on the number of coins contributed to the other 
player showed only a significant Emotion × SVO interaction, F(2, 
120) = 3.33, p < .05, ?p2 = .05. The effects of emotion condition on 
cooperation differed for prosocials and proselfs. For proselfs, guilt 
feelings had a significant influence on cooperation. Proselfs in the 
Guilt condition contributed significantly more than proselfs in the 
Control condition, t(47) = 2.64, p < .05, and proselfs in the Shame 
condition, t(53) = 3.50, p < .001. Proselfs in the Shame condition 
did not contribute significantly more than proselfs in the Control 
condition, t(48) = 0.37, ns. If anything, proselfs in the Shame 
condition contributed less than participants in the Control 
condition. For prosocials, there was no significant difference 
between the Guilt condition and the Control condition, t(30) = 0.25, 
ns, and between the Guilt condition and the Shame condition, 
t(30) = 0.61, ns. Also, contributions of prosocials in the Shame 
condition did not differ significantly from contributions of prosocials 
in the Control condition, t(32) = 0.28, ns. These results could not 
be explained by Gender, as a 3 (Emotion condition) × 2 (Gender) 
ANOVA showed no significant results, F(2, 120) = 0.43, ns. Thus, 
guilt motivated cooperation only for proselfs whereas shame did 
not have any influence on cooperation.  
 
Discussion 
 
Contrary to the assumption of scholars like Smith (1759) and 
Frank (1988/2004), this study showed that not all moral emotions 
motivate cooperation. Using a procedure similar to that of Ketelaar 
and Au (2003) and Nelissen et al. (2007), we found that guilt 
increased cooperation in a dyadic social dilemma game especially 
for proselfs. Shame, another moral emotion, did not motivate 
cooperation in a dyadic social dilemma.  
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It is important to note that the effect of guilt on cooperation is a 
perfect replication of Ketelaar and Au (2003), even though 
different measures were used. While they used the first 40 rounds 
of a repeated bargaining game to assess the social motives of 
their participants, the present study used an independent and 
validated measure to classify participants as prosocials or proselfs 
(Van Lange et al., 1997). In addition, Ketelaar and Au used the 
first 10 rounds of the second set of 40 rounds of the repeated 
social dilemma game to measure cooperation, while the present 
study used a single-shot give-some dilemma game that was 
clearly unrelated to the SVO measure. Despite these procedural 
differences, the cooperative effect of guilt on behavior for proselfs 
was replicated. We consider this a very valuable replication, 
because until now the results of Ketelaar and Au and Nelissen et 
al. (2007) constituted the sole support for increased cooperation 
after guilt. The effect of guilt on cooperation appears to be fairly 
robust.  
 
In contrast to the current findings for guilt, no evidence was found 
for increased cooperation in the social dilemma game after 
induction of shame. If anything, this emotion led to a 
(nonsignificant) decrease in cooperation in the social dilemma. At 
least in the situations examined here, this finding suggests that not 
all moral emotions motivate cooperative behavior.  
 
There are three alternative explanations for the results that cannot 
be ruled out on the basis of the data obtained in Experiment 2.1. 
First, it could be that the induction of shame was less successful 
or less intense than the induction of guilt. The emotion 
manipulation check in Experiment 2.1 does not preclude this, 
because participants were asked to indicate the intensity of the 
emotions experienced in the described situation and not the 
emotions experienced at that moment. Thus, we do not know 
whether autobiographical recall had similar effects for shame as 
for guilt on current emotional experience. 
 
A second reason why the induction of shame might not have been 
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successful is the time elapsed between the recalled event and the 
moment in which the experiment took place. Rimé, Mesquita, 
Philippot, and Boca (1991), for example, found that shame events 
took place longer ago than guilt events in their study on the social 
sharing of emotions. This may imply that the shame events 
reported in the current study could have taken place longer ago 
than the guilt events. If this is the case, shame experiences could 
have been less intense than guilt experiences and therefore would 
have no effect on cooperation. We do not think that the results of 
Rimé et al. can be easily generalized to our study, because they 
investigated emotional events that people tended to talk about with 
others and these may differ from the one that people write about in 
the task we used. But, because the time elapsed since the event 
was not asked, this possibility cannot be ruled out. 
 
A third reason for the non-effects of shame may be that the 
measure of cooperation was not sensitive to the effects of shame. 
Cooperation was measured in a one-shot, dyadic social dilemma 
game. It is possible that the effects of shame on cooperation can 
not be picked up by social dilemma games. Other measures for 
cooperation could show whether the present results in Experiment 
2.1 can be generalized to other cooperation settings.  
 
In order to address these points, a second experiment was 
conducted. In Experiment 2.2, shame and guilt again were 
induced using the autobiographical recall procedure. Following the 
emotion induction, participants reported the emotions they were 
feeling at that very moment. To control for possible differences in 
shame and guilt in time elapsed between the moment the reported 
event took place and the experiment, participants were asked to 
indicate the time elapsed since the event took place. Finally, to 
see whether the results of Experiment 2.1 can be generalized 
outside social dilemma games, we measured cooperation with the 
Prosocial Tendencies Scale, a nine-item scale considering 
cooperation in daily situations. A replication of Experiment 2.1 for 
the effects of both guilt and shame was expected.  
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Experiment 2.2 
 
Method 
 
Participants. Undergraduate students at Avans University Breda 
and at Tilburg University (78 males and 73 females, Mage = 21, SD 
= 2.72) volunteered to participate in this study. They were 
randomly assigned to one of the three emotion conditions of the 3 
(Emotion condition: Control vs. Guilt vs. Shame) × 2 (SVO: 
Prosocial vs. Proself) between subjects-factorial design. Originally, 
one hundred and fifty one students participated in this study, but 
thirty three participants who could not be classified as prosocial or 
proself were left out of analyses. Fifty two percent of the males 
and 35% of the females were proselfs. 
 
Procedure and Variables. Participants were seated and informed 
that the questionnaire they would fill in consisted of multiple, 
unrelated studies. Again, all the tasks were unrelated and we were 
interested in whether emotion induction in task one would 
influence cooperation in task two. First, depending upon the 
condition, participants were asked to report a personal experience 
in which they felt very guilty (Guilt condition) or very ashamed 
(Shame condition), or to describe a regular weekday (Control 
condition). This is the same manipulation as in Experiment 2.1.  
 
After describing the personal experience, participants were asked 
to indicate the time elapsed since this event took place. They 
indicated how many weeks, months and years ago the event took 
place. The reported time elapsed was converted to weeks. Then, 
to check whether the emotion manipulation worked properly, 
participants rated how much shame and guilt they felt at that very 
moment. Participants were also asked to rate how much regret, 
disappointment, sadness, fear, anger at self, anger at others, and 
dissatisfaction they felt at that moment. All emotions were rated on 
11-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly).  
 
Next, participants continued with a new task, a cooperation 
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questionnaire that was the dependent measure. This 
questionnaire was a specially developed measure of general 
cooperation tendencies, hereafter referred to as the Prosocial 
Tendencies Scale. This 9-item state measure was inspired by a 
23-item trait cooperation measure, the Prosocial Tendencies 
Measure (Carlo & Randall, 2002). From the Prosocial Tendencies 
Measure the items concerning compliant helping (that is, helping 
others in response to a request), items concerning money or 
goods, and items concerning helping in order to enhance one’s 
own position were left out because these items did not reflect 
everyday, voluntary cooperation. A Factor Analysis on the nine 
items showed a clear one factor solution (see the Appendix 2.1 for 
the items and factor loadings). This factor had an eigenvalue of 
4.85, explained 50% of the variance, and the nine items formed a 
reliable scale (α = .89). For each item, participants were asked to 
report how much they wanted to undertake that action at that very 
moment. All items were rated on 11-point scales ranging from 0 
(not at all) to 10 (very much).  
 
At the end of the questionnaire, participants’ social value 
orientation (SVO) was assessed via the Triple Dominance 
Measure (Van Lange et al., 1997). Participants were classified as 
prosocials (n = 66) or proselfs (n = 52) based on at least six (out of 
nine) consistent choices. This classification was unaffected by the 
emotion induction, ?²(2, N = 118) = 0.39, ns. After completion of all 
tasks participants were thanked and debriefed.  
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check. Results of both the manipulation checks and 
cooperation are displayed in Table 2.3. The manipulation checks 
showed that the emotion inductions were successful. Participants 
in the Guilt condition reported significantly more guilt than 
participants in the Shame condition, t(90) = 2.02, p < .05, and 
participants in the Control condition, t(79) = 15.80 p < .001. 
Participants in the Shame condition reported significantly more 
shame than participants in the Guilt condition, t(90) = 2.92, p < 
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.01, and participants in the Control condition, t(83) = 10.18, p < 
.001. More importantly, participants in the Guilt condition felt more 
guilty than ashamed, t(43) = 2.98, p < .01, and participants in the 
Shame condition felt more ashamed than guilty, t(47) = 4.18, p < 
.001. There were no differences between Guilt and Shame 
conditions on the other assessed emotions (all ts(90) < 1.61). The 
emotion manipulation worked for both proselfs and prosocials, as 
all reported tests were also significant for prosocials and proselfs. 
There was no difference between reported time elapsed in the 
Guilt condition (M = 117, SD = 198) and the Shame condition (M = 
91, SD = 115, t(90) = 0.70, ns). Furthermore, the reported time 
elapsed had no influence on the reported guilt, ? = .12, ns, no 
influence on reported shame, ? = .14, ns, and no influence on 
cooperation, ? = .11, ns. 
 
Table 2.3  
Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses of Experienced Emotion and 
Cooperation in Experiment 2.2 
 
 
Emotion Condition 
 
 
Control 
(n=37) 
M    (SD) 
 
Guilt  
(n=44) 
M    (SD) 
 
Shame 
(n=48) 
M    (SD) 
Experienced Emotion    
Guilt 0.41 (0.69) 6.11 (2.10) 5.08 (2.73) 
Prosocial 0.41 (0.67) 6.42 (2.02) 5.06 (2.69) 
Proself 0.40 (0.74) 5.84 (2.22) 5.13 (2.90) 
Shame 0.62 (1.04) 5.25 (2.50) 6.65 (2.09) 
Prosocial 0.73 (1.16) 5.42 (2.67) 6.75 (1.97) 
Proself 0.47 (0.83) 4.95 (2.35) 6.44 (2.34) 
Cooperation    
Prosocials 6.72 (1.21) 6.06 (.90) 6.26 (1.12) 
Proselfs 5.31 (1.90) 6.36 (.78) 5.41 (1.44) 
Note. Shame and guilt were measured on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (not 
at all) to 10 (very strongly). Cooperation reflects the mean score on the nine 
cooperation items, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). 
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Cooperation. This experiment again tested two hypotheses. First, 
guilt was hypothesized to increase cooperation especially for 
proselfs, replicating Experiment 2.1 and the findings of Ketelaar 
and Au (2003). Proselfs in the Guilt condition were expected to 
have a higher score on the cooperation scale than proselfs in the 
Control condition. Second, also replicating Experiment 2.1, shame 
was hypothesized to have no effect on cooperation. Participants in 
the Shame condition were expected to have the same score on 
the cooperation scale as participants in the Control condition.  
 
The findings supported our hypotheses. As predicted, a 3 
(Emotion condition) × 2 (SVO) ANOVA showed only a significant 
Emotion × SVO interaction, F(2, 99) = 4.02, p < .05, ?p2 = .08. The 
effects of emotion condition on cooperation differed for prosocials 
and proselfs. For proselfs, guilt feelings had a significant influence 
on cooperation. Proselfs in the Guilt condition had a significant 
higher score than proselfs in the Control condition, t(29) = 1.97, p 
= .05, and proselfs in the Shame condition, t(28) = 2.24, p < .05. 
Proselfs in the Shame condition did not have a significant different 
score compared to proselfs in the Control condition, t(29) = .16, 
ns. For prosocials, there was no significant difference between the 
Guilt condition and the Control condition, t(36) = 1.92, ns, and 
between the Guilt condition and the Shame condition, t(36) = 0.64, 
ns. Also, scores of prosocials in the Shame condition did not differ 
significantly from scores of prosocials in the Control condition, 
t(40) = 1.30, ns. These results could not be explained by Gender, 
as a 3 (Emotion condition) × 2 (Gender) ANOVA showed no 
significant results, F(2, 99) = 2.04, ns. Thus, again, guilt motivated 
cooperation for proselfs whereas shame did not have any 
influence on cooperation.  
 
Discussion 
 
In this experiment, the findings of Experiment 2.1 were fully 
replicated. Guilt again motivated cooperation for proselfs, this time 
on the Prosocial Tendencies Scale. In contrast, shame, the other 
moral emotion, did not have any influence on cooperation in 
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everyday situations.  
 
These results showing the positive effect of guilt on cooperation 
and the non-effect of shame on cooperation cannot be explained 
by a less successful or less intense induction of shame compared 
to guilt, neither by the time elapsed since the reported event took 
place. Both of these were possible alternative explanations of the 
absence of an effect of shame in Experiment 2.1.We consider the 
most important finding the replication for both guilt and shame on 
a totally different cooperation measure, the specially developed 
Prosocial Tendencies Scale. This makes the findings from 
Experiment 2.1 more reliable and shows that the effects of guilt 
and shame on cooperation can be generalized to different 
situations. 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
Economists and psychologists like Frank (1988/2004), Ketelaar 
(2004), and Smith (1759) assumed that moral emotions motivate 
cooperation. Two studies have shown that this claim is not 
applicable to all moral emotions. While the moral emotion guilt 
motivated cooperation in both social dilemma situations and 
everyday situations, shame, another moral emotion, did not have 
an effect on cooperation in either of these measures. Thus, not all 
moral emotions motivate cooperative behavior.  
 
The differential effects of guilt and shame on cooperation can be 
explained by inspecting the motivations that accompany the 
emotions (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, & Pieters, 2007). We think that 
specific emotions motivate people to behave in different ways, 
leading to different behaviors. Guilt signals that one has hurt 
another person and motivates reparative behavior in order to undo 
the wrongdoing (Tangney et al., 1996). As prosocial or cooperative 
behavior is a way to repair, this emotion motivates cooperation in 
social dilemmas and in everyday situations. Shame signals that 
one has made a mistake and motivates withdrawal in the short 
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term in order to avoid more mistakes (Tangney et al., 1996). As 
cooperation or prosocial behavior is not a withdrawal strategy, 
shame will not have any influence on cooperation in the short 
term.  
 
The effect of guilt on cooperation appears to be fairly robust. 
Ketelaar and Au (2003), Nelissen et al. (2007) and Experiment 2.1 
found guilt to motivate cooperation in social dilemma games. This 
finding was replicated with an everyday cooperation measure in 
Experiment 2.2. This effect of guilt can play an important role in 
economic behavior. While economic theory assumes that people 
act according to immediate self-interest, guilt is a moral emotion 
that can easily motivate people to act more cooperatively. 
 
The findings can also play an important role in emotion research. 
The present studies show that in addition to the variables 
measured in traditional emotion research, guilt and shame can be 
differentiated on the basis of the behavioral consequences that 
ensue from the emotions. Here, emotion researchers can benefit 
adopting a decision-making perspective. Decision researchers 
have traditionally focused on the effects of variables on behavioral 
choice, and the current research shows how some of their 
paradigms can be useful in differentiating emotions. 
 
Like Ketelaar and Au (2003) and Nelissen et al. (2007), we only 
found a cooperative effect of guilt for proselfs. One may argue that 
in prosocials the motivation to act cooperatively is chronically 
activated (Nelissen et al., 2007), hence no additional activation of 
this motivation by guilt is to be expected. In contrast, for proselfs a 
cooperative motivation is not chronically activated. For these 
people, the experience of guilt activates this motivation and 
subsequently increases cooperation. As shame does not activate 
a motivation to cooperate, there are no differential effects of this 
emotion for proselfs and prosocials.  
 
Before closing, we would like to make three observations 
regarding the specifics of the present experiments that call for 
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future research. The first observation pertains to the reported 
emotions in the Shame and Guilt conditions. The amount of guilt 
reported in the Shame condition is lower than the amount of 
reported shame, but still greater than the amount of guilt reported 
in the Control condition. If guilt has a separate bearing on 
cooperative behavior then we would have expected proselfs to 
have shown at least some increase in cooperation in the Shame 
condition in comparison to the Control condition. The fact that 
such an effect was not found may suggest that, even though we 
may experience multiple emotions at the same time, our behaviors 
are motivated by a single emotion at that time. There may be 
several explanations for this finding. It is possible that the 
strongest emotion cancels out the action tendencies of any other 
emotions, leaving only shame to influence cooperation in the 
Shame condition. It is also possible that the strongest emotion 
gets action priority (see Frijda, 1986) whereas less intense 
emotions, when not faded yet, can influence behavior after the 
strongest emotion has been reacted upon. This would mean that 
guilt could still affect cooperative behaviors after the effects of 
shame have faded. There is a clear need for future research 
considering how multiple experienced emotions influence our 
behavior. 
 
A second observation concerns the used measures for 
cooperation. The replication of the present results on these two 
very different measures suggests that the findings can be 
considered fairly robust. However, the finding that shame does not 
motivate cooperation on these measures does not necessarily 
imply that shame does not motivate cooperation in general. We 
only considered short-term cooperation and not long-term 
cooperation. It is possible that shame motivates cooperation in the 
long term, for example by conformity to group norms (see Fessler, 
2004). Further empirical research is needed to investigate whether 
the long-term effects of shame on cooperation are similar to the 
short-term effects of shame.  
 
A third observation relates to the emotion manipulation used in the 
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current studies. In both studies, emotions were induced with an 
autobiographical recall procedure. This procedure was also used 
by Ketelaar and Au (2003), Nelissen et al. (2007) and others. In 
such a procedure, the emotional state that is elicited is not directly 
related to the following task (in this case the dyadic interaction and 
the cooperation scale). Zeelenberg and Pieters (2006) term 
emotions in such situations as “exogenous,” to emphasize the fact 
that the emotional influence comes from outside the relevant 
situation. In the present studies, it was assumed that the 
motivation activated by the emotion influences behavior across 
situations. This is supported by the findings that exogenous guilt 
motivated cooperation, corresponding to the motivation to repair, 
and that exogenous shame did not influence cooperation, 
corresponding to the motivation to withdraw. As yet it is not clear 
whether these exogenous effects of emotions are always similar to 
their endogenous effects (that is, when the emotion is directly 
relevant for the task at hand). One study supporting the 
assumption that exogenous and endogenous effects of emotions 
are similar is the second study of Ketelaar and Au (2003). The 
results of this study showed that endogenous guilt had the same 
effects on cooperation as exogenous guilt. This finding gives 
support for the assumption that the present results also apply to 
endogenous guilt. There is, however, no research considering the 
effects of endogenous shame. It may be the case that experiences 
of shame that are directly relevant for a current social interaction 
do have an effect on that interaction. For example, some social 
dilemma games include an exit option. This option offers people 
the possibility to avoid the interaction situation altogether without 
the would-be interaction partner ever knowing about the possibility 
of interacting (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006). We would expect 
shame to have effects in such a situation, because of its 
motivational tendency to withdraw from the situation. It may also 
be the case that exogenous shame does not motivate cooperation, 
but that endogenous shame does motivate cooperation. We are 
currently exploring the effects of endogenous shame on 
cooperation.  
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In closing, let us return to the question that motivated the 
research, namely whether moral emotions in general promote 
cooperative behavior. We have obtained clear support for the idea 
that different moral emotions may have specific effects on 
cooperative behavior. As such, this research demonstrated the 
use of thinking about emotions in motivational terms and the 
importance of emotion specific predictions, even when considering 
emotions that are so closely related as shame and guilt. 
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Appendix 2.1 
 
Items and Factor Loadings of the Prosocial Tendencies Scale used in 
Experiment 2.2 (N = 117, α = .89) 
 
Item Factor  
loading 
1. help an unknown other .72 
2. help a person while others are looking at me .70 
3. comfort someone who is emotionally very upset .68 
4. help a person when (s)he does not know who is 
helping 
.72 
5. help a person while I get in the spotlight as a 
consequence 
.59 
6. support a person who is emotionally distressed .74 
7. help a person without him/her knowing .59 
8. help a person while others are watching the way I do 
everything 
.68 
9. help someone who hurt him/herself .60 
Note. Items were complements to the sentence “At this moment I would like 
to...” and could be answered at 11-point scales with end points labeled 0 (not at 
all) and 10 (very much). 
 
2 This chapter is based on De Hooge, Breugelmans & Zeelenberg (in press)  43 
Chapter 3 
 
 
Not So Ugly After All: 
 
When Shame Acts As a  
 
Commitment Device2 
 
Shame is one of the most intense self-conscious emotions 
(Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1991), playing a central role in 
development, pathology and self-regulation (Erikson, 1963; Freud, 
1923/1961). Many psychologists tend to think of shame as a 
painful emotion that has profound negative psychological and 
behavioral consequences (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002). These 
negative consequences raise questions with respect to the 
function of shame, because emotion theorists generally assume 
that emotions are functional in the sense that they promote 
behavior that has beneficial consequences for the individual or 
community (Frijda, 1986; Keltner & Gross, 1999). As such, the 
current psychological knowledge of shame poses a kind of 
paradox: how could shame be a functional emotion when it has 
only negative psychological consequences? 
 
Emotions that entail negative experiences can be functional. Moral 
emotions, for example, are assumed to motivate prosocial 
interpersonal behaviors (e.g., Haidt, 2003). Moral emotions make 
selfish behavior less attractive, thereby promoting behavior that is 
beneficial to others within one’s social group (Frank, 1988, 2004; 
Ketelaar, 2004; Smith, 1759). However, such prosocial effects 
have been found for guilt but not yet for shame (see Chapter 2). In 
this article we solve the apparent paradox concerning the function 
of shame by revealing that shame motivates prosocial behavior 
when its experience is relevant for the decision at hand (what we 
refer to as endogenous), but that its experience has no such effect 
when it is not relevant (what we refer to as exogenous). First an 
overview is provided regarding the supposedly opposing views of 
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shame as an ugly emotion one the one hand and as a moral 
emotion on the other hand, and then the role of the relevance of 
emotion is explained in solving this paradox. To our knowledge, 
the data constitute the first empirical evidence of positive 
interpersonal effects of shame, providing more insight in the 
function of this prevalent self-conscious emotion.  
 
 
The Function of Shame as an Ugly Emotion 
 
In 1991, Tangney summarized the scientific knowledge concerning 
shame as follows: “Shame is an ugly feeling” (p. 600). Shame is 
an overwhelming and unpleasant emotion associated with feelings 
of worthlessness, inferiority, and of a damaged self-image 
(Ausubel, 1955). Experiences of shame are characterized by 
confusion in thought, inability to speak, and rumination (e.g., 
Miller, 1995; Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006). The primary 
tendency associated with this emotion is to withdraw from the 
situation that elicited the shame and to hide from other people 
(Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995; Tangney & Fischer, 
1995). Many scholars have described the negative psychological 
and behavioral consequences of shame, for example by linking 
chronic experiences of shame to having a lower self-esteem, less 
empathy, more shyness, more social anxiety, and a higher 
likelihood of depression (e.g., Gilbert, Pehl, & Allan, 1994; Harder, 
Cutler, & Rockart, 1992). This consensus on the negative effects 
of shame has led Tangney (1999) to question whether shame 
serves any adaptive functions at all.  
 
The absence of a positive function of shame is especially puzzling 
because emotions are currently understood as psychological 
processes that function to benefit the person or society (Keltner & 
Gross, 1999). Emotions react to signals in the environment that 
one’s concerns are at stake and motivate goal-directed behaviors 
that serve to protect and further these concerns (Frijda, 1986; 
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). Depending on the situation, their 
effects can be functional or dysfunctional, and the dysfunctional 
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effects help to understand what is necessary for emotions to be 
functional (Parrott, 2001b). It is useful to differentiate the function 
of an emotion from its behavioral consequences, although the two 
are obviously related. The function of an emotion is a theoretical 
account of why it motivates particular types of behavior and is 
directed towards benefiting one’s own best interest. The 
observable behavioral consequences of emotions are all possible 
effects that follow from an emotion (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001). 
Functions can be defined at the intrapersonal level, coordinating 
physiological, perceptual and cognitive processes that enable the 
person to adapt, and at the interpersonal level, addressing 
concerns within ongoing interactions such as redressing injustice 
or mate protection (Keltner & Gross, 1999). Especially for self-
conscious emotions, which are grounded in social relationships, a 
prime function is to adjust interpersonal relationships (De Rivera, 
1984; Caplovitz Barrett, 1995). For example, Baumeister, Stillwell, 
and Heatherton (1994) have argued that guilt serves relationship-
enhancing functions by motivating people to treat partners well 
and to avoid interpersonal transgressions. However, the field of 
emotion research has remained largely mute with regard to 
possible interpersonal functions of shame. An exception are 
Fessler and Haley (2003, p. 26), who speculated about the 
possible functions of shame: “Shame and pride can promote 
cooperation in purely dyadic interactions, as the actor can feel 
shame if she defects and the partner knows about, or is likely to 
learn of, her defection”. 
 
There is an abundance of empirical research on shame, but there 
are at least two reasons why the empirical record so far has not 
shed much light upon the possible interpersonal functions of 
shame. First, research supporting the view of shame as an ugly 
emotion consists primarily of studies concerning the correlates of 
shame-proneness and not of situationally induced experiences of 
shame. Shame-proneness is the general tendency of an individual 
to experience shame (Tangney, 1990). This research convincingly 
shows that people who are likely to experience shame, or who 
experience shame very frequently, are also prone to feelings of 
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inferiority, anxiety, lessened empathy, shyness, interpersonal 
distrust, and depression (Gilbert et al., 1994; Harder et al., 1992; 
Tangney and Dearing, 2002). However, it is not at all clear that 
these findings of shame-proneness as a trait can be generalized to 
experiences of the emotion shame as a state. As a case in point, 
Allan, Gilbert, and Goss (1994) examined the relationship of 
shame-proneness and actual experiences of shame with multiple 
factors. Although shame-proneness and experiences of shame 
were related, they were found to have different relations with 
social dysfunction, feelings of inferiority, and anger. While shame-
proneness was strongly related to depression and social 
dysfunction, experiences of shame were related to feelings of 
inferiority and anger at self and others. This finding was recently 
replicated by Rüsch et al. (2007), who found that shame-
proneness was negatively related to self-efficacy and 
empowerment, and positively related to psychopathology, while 
experiences of shame were only related to state anxiety. 
 
A second reason why studies of shame may have failed to capture 
the interpersonal functions of shame is methodological. The few 
studies that did focus on the interpersonal effects of shame as a 
state only examined a limited set of action tendencies. In line with 
the view of shame as an ugly emotion, studies have so far mainly 
focused on tendencies to withdraw or to hide. For example, 
Wicker, Payne, and Morgan (1983) found that people reported a 
higher tendency to hide after describing a shame experience than 
after describing a guilt experience. Tangney, Miller, Flicker, and 
Barlow (1996) replicated this finding in a comparison of shame, 
guilt, and embarrassment. In addition, they measured the 
tendency to admit what people had done and to make amends, 
showing that people who experienced shame reported a lower 
inclination of both tendencies compared to guilt. Frijda, Kuipers, 
and Ter Schure (1989) measured behavioral tendencies to 
approach others, to disappear, to move away from others, and to 
reject things. They found that shame was characterized by the 
tendency to disappear from view but also by the desire to undo the 
shame situation. These action tendencies are an important 
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experiential component of emotions, because they reflect the 
priority of goal-directed behavior that is motivated by the emotion 
(Frijda, 1986). However, the relationship between action 
tendencies and actual behavior is not always strong and 
sometimes even absent because of the many situational, 
personal, and social factors that may intervene (Frijda, 2004). 
Thus, we can tentatively conclude that studies of shame 
experiences so far have not yet addressed the possibility that 
shame may serve a positive interpersonal function.  
 
 
The Function of Shame as a Moral Emotion 
 
Apart from being a self-conscious emotion, shame has also been 
perceived as one of the moral emotions that motivate prosocial 
behavior (e.g., Emde & Oppenheim, 1995; Goldberg, 1991). Moral 
emotions are emotions that are linked to the interests of other 
people (Haidt, 2003). Adam Smith, the founder of modern 
economics, suggested as early as 1759 that moral sentiments 
lead people to focus on the other and on how one’s own behavior 
affects the others’ well-being. When there is a conflict between self 
interest and others’ interests (i.e., a social dilemma), moral 
sentiments motivate people to take into account other people’s 
interests. This view has been developed further by Frank (1988, 
2004), according to whom moral emotions commit people to a 
prosocial, long-term strategy, when selfishness might seduce them 
to choose immediate rewards at the expense of others. When 
choosing the immediate reward elicits unpleasant moral emotions 
such as shame or guilt, this behavioral alternative becomes less 
attractive. Thus, moral emotions have an interpersonal function in 
that they stimulate prosocial behaviors in the short run, committing 
people to long-term prosocial strategies. In Frank’s words: “these 
emotions serve as commitment devices” (p. 5). It should be 
emphasized that this conception does not contradict the view that 
personal experiences of shame may be negative or even ugly. 
Rather, it emphasizes that the actual function of shame lies in 
promoting prosocial behavior. Note, however, that this theorizing 
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has not yet been the subject of extensive empirical testing.  
 
The proposed prosocial effects of moral emotions have only 
recently been supported by empirical research. For example, 
Ketelaar and Au (2003) showed that people with the natural 
tendency to act selfishly acted more prosocially in social dilemmas 
and ultimatum games when they experienced guilt. These findings 
were replicated by Nelissen, Dijker, and De Vries (2007), who 
found that induction of the moral emotion guilt increased prosocial 
behavior for people with the tendency to act selfishly, but that 
induction of the non-moral emotion fear did not. However, in 
contrast to guilt, the case for shame as a moral emotion is less 
clear. In a series of recent studies we found prosocial effects for 
guilt, but not for shame (Chapter 2). Guilt experiences increased 
prosocial behavior in everyday situations as well as in a social 
dilemma, but these effects were not found when participants 
recalled experiences of shame.  
 
To summarize, the view of shame as a moral emotion suggests 
that it may have an interpersonal function, but the empirical 
evidence is still wanting. We think that shame does have this 
prosocial function, but that previous studies have not been able to 
find this because of the way that emotions were induced. We 
argue that the relevance of the induced emotion for the behavioral 
decision at hand is crucial for understanding the interpersonal 
function of shame.  
 
 
Exogenous and Endogenous Influences of Shame 
 
Maybe the most important reason to study emotions is that they 
can explain or predict human behavior (Frijda, 2004). The 
influence of emotions on behavior is either exogenous or 
endogenous to current goal pursuit (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). 
In the literature, this distinction has been made under different 
names like integral versus incidental emotions (Lerner & Keltner, 
2000) and task-related versus incidental affect (Garg, Inman, & 
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Mittal, 2005). We prefer to use exogenous and endogenous 
influences of emotions because these terms precisely capture 
whether the influence comes from within (endogenous) or outside 
(exogenous) the goal striving process. Influences of emotions are 
denoted as endogenous when they concern behaviors in 
situations that are related to the emotion-causing event. These 
influences are relevant for and part of current goal pursuit. 
Examples are the influence of fear of animals on the decision to 
visit a zoo, or the experience of sadness when taking a loved one 
to the airport for her departure. One instance of endogenous 
influence in research is Ketelaar and Au’s (2003) study 2, where 
guilt felt after selfish behavior in a social dilemma influenced 
subsequent interactions with the same interaction partner. We 
refer to influences of emotions as exogenous when they influence 
behaviors in situations that are unrelated to the emotion-causing 
event. These influences are irrelevant for and external to current 
goal-pursuit. Examples of exogenous influences are the spill-over 
effects of emotions resulting from a prior experience, such as 
watching a happy or a sad movie, on subsequent, unrelated 
decisions, such as deciding how much to tip the driver of the cab 
that brings you home. Endogenous and exogenous influences of 
emotions can have similar behavioral effects, such as guilt 
motivating prosocial behavior in related and unrelated situations 
(Ketelaar & Au, 2003). However, due to the specific action 
tendencies of shame, we think that a distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous influences of emotions is especially 
important for understanding the interpersonal effects of shame, as 
will be outlined below. 
 
The central focus of experiences of shame is a threatened self 
(Lewis, 1971). Thus, a central motivation of shame will be to cope 
with this threat. Possible action tendencies following this 
motivation are social withdrawal (i.e., leaving or hiding; Tangney et 
al., 1996), but also prosocial behavior (Goldberg, 1991). These 
action tendencies represent different behavioral options that 
people can use in order to prevent more damage or even restore 
the threatened self that is experienced in shame. 
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When the influence of shame is exogenous, that is not relevant to 
the current decision situation, the situation in which the self was 
threatened is already different from the decision situation at hand. 
For example, one might still feel residual shame over having given 
a very bad presentation at a conference when one is sitting in an 
airplane flying home directly after one’s talk. In this case, the 
shame is no longer relevant for any decision taken in the airplane, 
for example when a stranger asks to swap seats. In fact, by being 
in a different situation, the motivation underlying shame has 
already been (partially) satisfied because one has already left the 
threatening situation (i.e., your peers at the conference venue). 
Therefore, the shame is no longer part of the current goal pursuit 
and no effects of shame on prosocial behavior are to be expected. 
Indeed, in previous studies we found no effects of shame on 
prosocial behavior in situations unrelated to the induction 
procedure (Chapter 2).  
 
When the influence of shame is endogenous, that is relevant to 
the current decision situation, stronger behavioral effects can be 
expected. For example, if one is still at the conference venue after 
the very bad presentation, one’s self would still be threatened and 
shame would still motivate action tendencies aimed at reducing or 
alleviating this threat. One may feel the urge to withdraw from the 
situation by leaving the conference early, but withdrawal may not 
always be a realistic option. Alternatively, when confronted with 
one’s peers at the conference dinner, one may cope with the 
damaged self by complying with norms for prosocial behavior. In 
this case, the shame is still highly relevant for one’s decisions at 
the dinner, for example when an unknown colleague asks to swap 
seats. Therefore, we hypothesize that endogenous shame does 
motivate prosocial behavior, while exogenous shame does not. 
This prediction is consistent with the analysis of shame as a 
commitment device, because that theory also predicts prosocial 
effects and is explicitly designed to explain effects of moral 
emotions which we call currently endogenous (Frank, 1988, 2004).  
 
Interestingly, the theory of shame as a commitment device also 
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makes another prediction about who will be affected most by 
experiences of shame. Some people, called prosocials, have a 
natural tendency to act prosocially, whereas others, called 
proselfs, have a natural tendency to act more selfishly (Messick & 
McClintock, 1968). Moral emotions act as commitment devices by 
making immediate selfish options less attractive. Shame is 
expected to motivate prosocial behavior especially in people who 
are tempted to choose the immediate selfish option (i.e., proselfs). 
Ample research has shown that situational activation of a goal only 
affects behavior of people for whom that goal is not already 
chronically activated (Higgins, 1996). Because acting prosocially 
can be seen as a chronically activated goal for prosocials (see 
Nelissen et al., 2007) endogenous shame should have little effect 
on their level of prosocial behavior. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
endogenous shame most strongly affects the behavior of proselfs 
by motivating them to act prosocially. This differential behavioral 
effect for prosocials and proselfs has already been shown in 
studies of guilt (Chapter 2; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen et al., 
2007). Here, we argue that similar results should be found for 
shame, but only when the emotion is relevant for the current 
decision, that is, when it is endogenous.  
 
 
Examining the Prosocial Effects of Shame 
 
Let us summarize: the current research addresses the 
interpersonal function of shame. The views of shame as an ugly 
emotion and shame as a moral emotion appear to espouse 
contrasting predictions with regard to the question of whether 
shame does or does not have a positive interpersonal function 
(i.e., can promote prosocial behavior). We try to reconcile these 
contradicting views by showing that exogenous shame does not 
augment prosocial behavior (in line with the view of shame as an 
ugly emotion), but that endogenous shame does augment 
prosocial behavior (in line with the view of shame as a moral 
emotion). The behavioral effects of shame should be found mainly 
for people with proself orientations, because for these people the 
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motivation to behave prosocially is not chronically activated. 
 
In order to provide a thorough test of our predictions four 
experiments were conducted, using three different types of shame 
inductions and two different measures for prosocial behavior. In 
the first three experiments prosocial behavior was measured in a 
social dilemma situation. One-shot social dilemma situations are 
often used to study commitment to long-term prosocial strategies, 
because the costly choice for mutual cooperation in these 
situations is only beneficial in the long run (Frank, 2004; Ketelaar, 
2004). In Experiment 3.1 shame was induced via a scenario 
describing a performance situation, in Experiment 3.2 shame was 
induced with an autobiographical recall procedure, and in 
Experiment 3.3 shame was induced in the lab using an actual 
performance situation. In Experiment 3.4, shame was again 
induced with a scenario, as in Experiment 3.1, but general 
prosocial tendencies in everyday situations were measured. 
Because the design of the four studies and the general approach 
was identical, we describe them here. The specifics of each 
experiment are described in the separate method sections. 
 
In all experiments participants were assigned to the conditions of a 
2 (Emotion condition: Shame vs. Control) × 2 (Emotion influence: 
Exogenous vs. Endogenous) between subjects-factorial design 
with prosocial behavior as the dependent variable. Participants 
first completed the emotion induction that will be described 
separately for each experiment.  
 
In Experiments 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, participants continued with a 10-
coin give-some dilemma game (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), the 
dependent measure of prosocial behavior. This measure is often 
used in social dilemma research (Chapter 2; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; 
Nelissen et al., 2007). In this game, the nature of exogenous and 
endogenous shame was manipulated by coupling the participant 
with different interaction partners. In the Exogenous condition, the 
interaction partner was unaware of and unrelated to the shame 
event. In the Endogenous condition, the interaction partner was 
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related to and aware of the shame event. In the 10-coin give-some 
dilemma the participants have ten coins, each worth ?0.50 for the 
participant but ?1 for the interaction partner. The interaction 
partner also has ten coins, each worth ?0.50 for themselves but ?1 
for the participant. The participant decides how many coins to give 
to the interaction partner, without knowing how many coins the 
interaction partner would give. In this game, participants would 
earn most if they kept all their coins for themselves (the most 
selfish option). In contrast, dyads would earn most if the two 
members offered all their coins to the other player (the most 
cooperative option). The number of coins offered was the measure 
of prosocial behavior. In Experiment 3.4, the nine-item Prosocial 
Tendencies Scale (Chapter 2) was used as the dependent 
measure.  
 
In all experiments, the overall tendency to act prosocially or 
selfishly was measured with the often-used Triple Dominance 
Measure of Social Value Orientations (Van Lange, Otten, De 
Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). This measure contains nine items 
consisting of different monetary divisions between the participant 
and an unknown other. The divisions encompass both prosocial 
(equality) and proself (maximizing and individualistic) choices. 
When participants made six or more consistent choices, they were 
classified as prosocials or proselfs. Following the standard 
procedure participants who could not be classified were left out of 
the analyses. Usually, this constitutes 10 to 20 % of all participants 
and in the present experiments this ranged from three to 11 %. 
Social value orientation was always measured last. In all studies, 
both manipulations of Emotion condition and Emotion influence 
had no effects on the SVO classification, all ?²s < 2.20, ns and all 
?²s < 1.70, ns, respectively. After completion of all tasks, 
participants were thanked and debriefed. In all experiments we 
tested the hypothesis that endogenous shame motivated prosocial 
behavior for proselfs and that exogenous shame had no influence 
on prosocial behavior. In the studies the Dutch emotion word 
“schaamte” was used for the English emotion word “shame.” 
Cross-cultural research shows that “schaamte” refers to similar 
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experiences as the English shame (see Breugelmans et al., 2005; 
Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006; Fontaine et al., 2006). 
 
 
Experiment 3.1 
 
Method  
 
Participants and design. One hundred forty four undergraduate 
students at Tilburg University participated in a series of unrelated 
studies and were paid ? 7 (= $9 at the time of the experiment). 
After exclusion of twelve participants who could not be classified 
as prosocial or proself, 132 participants remained (41 males and 
91 females, Mage = 21.48, SD = 2.41). There were 62 prosocials 
and 70 proselfs in the sample.  
 
Participants were asked to: “Imagine you are following a course 
where everybody has to give a presentation in a work group. In the 
work group, 25 fellow students are present.” In the Shame 
condition, participants then read: 
 
When you have to give your presentation everything goes completely 
wrong. You stumble over your own words, your story is muddled and at 
the end it is clear that nobody understood what you were trying to tell. At 
the end some people from the audience ask you questions. Then it 
becomes clear that you have no mastery of the subject at all.  
 
In the Control condition, participants read: “When you have to give 
your presentation everything goes normally. Your presentation is 
as good as those of the other students and in no way do you stand 
out.” A pretest of these materials (N = 123, Mage = 22) showed that 
participants in the Shame condition reported significantly more 
shame (on a scale ranging from 0 = not at all to 10 = very strongly) 
(M = 8.95, SD = 1.13) than participants in the Control condition, (M 
= 2.06, SD = 2.37), t(121) = 21.70, p < .001. 
 
After the emotion induction, participants imagined they played the 
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10-coin give-some dilemma game with a fellow student whom they 
did not know very well. In the Exogenous condition the fellow 
student had not seen the presentation. In the Endogenous 
condition the fellow student had seen the presentation. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Results are displayed in Table 3.1. We hypothesized that only 
endogenous shame would motivate prosocial behavior for 
proselfs. We expected participants in the Exogenous Shame 
condition to contribute the same amount of coins as participants in 
the Control conditions and we expected proselfs in the 
Endogenous Shame condition would contribute more to the other 
person than proselfs in the other three conditions.  
 
The findings supported our hypothesis. A 2 (Emotion condition: 
Shame vs. Control) × 2 (Emotion influence: Exogenous vs. 
Endogenous) × 2 (SVO: Prosocial vs. Proself) ANOVA with 
prosocial behavior as dependent variable showed significant main 
effects of Emotion influence, F(1, 124) = 9.95, p < .01, ?p2 = .07, 
and of SVO, F(1, 124) = 16.43, p < .001, ?p2 = .12, and showed no 
significant two-way interactions, all Fs (1, 124) < 3.01, ns. More 
importantly, the results showed a significant three-way interaction, 
F(1, 124) = 3.82, p = .05, ?p2 = .03. The effects of shame on 
prosocial behavior differed for prosocials and proselfs, depending 
on Emotion influence. Prosocials and proselfs did not contribute 
more in the Exogenous Shame condition compared to the 
Exogenous Control condition. Prosocials and proselfs also did not 
contribute more in the Exogenous Shame condition compared to 
the Endogenous Control condition, t(58) = 1.11, ns, and t(66) = 
1.70, ns, respectively.  
 
Endogenous shame did influence prosocial behavior. Proselfs in 
the Endogenous Shame condition contributed more to the 
interaction partner than proselfs in the Endogenous Control 
condition and proselfs in the Exogenous Control condition, t(66) = 
3.95, p < .001. A contrast analysis of Endogenous Shame versus 
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Exogenous Shame, Endogenous Control, and Exogenous Control 
also showed that proselfs acted more prosocially when 
experiencing endogenous shame, t(124) = 4.17, p < .001. For 
prosocials, there was no difference between Endogenous Shame 
and Endogenous Control, or between Endogenous Shame and 
Exogenous Control, t(58) = 0.13, ns. A contrast analysis of 
Endogenous Shame versus Exogenous Shame, Endogenous 
Control, and Exogenous Control showed no differences for 
prosocials, t(124) = 0.26, ns.  
 
Experiment 3.1 thus provided support for the hypothesis 
considering the prosocial effects of exogenous and endogenous 
shame. Exogenous shame did not influence behavior. In contrast, 
endogenous shame motivated prosocial behavior for proselfs. To 
replicate the findings of Experiment 3.1, we conducted Experiment 
3.2 using a different induction of shame.  
 
 
Experiment 3.2 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design. One hundred forty-seven undergraduate 
students of Tilburg University participated in this Experiment in 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement. After exclusion of twelve 
participants who could not be classified as prosocial or proself, 
135 participants remained (32 males and 103 females, Mage = 
19.68, SD = 2.86). There were 66 prosocials and 69 proselfs in the 
sample.  
 
Procedure and Variables. For the emotion induction manipulation, 
participants were asked to complete a questionnaire that was 
placed next to the computer. This questionnaire was adopted from 
Ketelaar and Au (2003). In the Shame condition, participants were 
asked to report a personal experience in which they felt very 
ashamed. For example, they wrote about failing an exam, a bad 
performance in sports, or behaving inappropriately while drunk. In 
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the Control condition, participants were asked to describe a 
normal weekday. Participants worked approximately 10 minutes 
on the emotion induction task. 
 
Next, participants continued with the 10-coin give-some dilemma 
game. In the Exogenous condition, participants imagined they 
played this game with a person whom they had never met before 
and would probably never meet again in the future. In the 
Endogenous condition, participants imagined they played with a 
person who was present at or knew of the described event 
(Shame condition) or the normal weekday (Control condition).  
 
After the game, participants were asked to reread their situation 
description and indicate how alone they felt, how much they felt 
that all attention was drawn towards them, how much they did not 
want others to know about the described event, and how much 
they were worried about what others would think of them. These 
are described in the emotion literature as basic elements of shame 
(Caplovitz Barrett, 1995; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Subsequently, 
participants rated how much shame they felt in the situation or on 
the normal weekday. Participants were also asked to indicate how 
much guilt, regret, disappointment, sadness, fear, anger at self, 
anger at others, and dissatisfaction they felt in the situation. All 
items were rated on 11-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 
10 (very strongly). Furthermore, to control for possible differences 
in type of interaction partner between conditions, participants were 
asked to indicate whether the person present was a close relative 
or partner, a friend or colleague, or a vaguely known or unknown 
other.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation checks showed that the 
manipulation of the emotion shame was successful. Participants in 
the Shame condition scored significantly higher on all basic 
elements of shame compared to participants in the Control 
condition, all ts (133) > 7.39, all ps < .01. Furthermore, participants 
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in the Shame condition felt significantly more shame (M = 8.49, 
SD = 1.45) than participants in the Control condition (M = 1.27, SD 
= 1.91), t(133) = 24.60, p < .001, and felt significantly more shame 
than other emotions, all ts (64) > 6.51, all ps < .001. There were 
no differences between the emotion conditions on the other 
assessed emotions. 
 
Prosocial behavior. Results for prosocial behavior are displayed in 
Table 3.1. Similar to Experiment 3.1, we expected that only 
endogenous shame would motivate prosocial behavior for 
proselfs. A 2 (Emotion condition) × 2 (Emotion influence) × 2 
(SVO) ANOVA with prosocial behavior as dependent variable 
supported our hypotheses. First, there were significant main 
effects of Emotion condition, F(1, 127) = 3.30, p = .07, ?p2 = .03, of 
Emotion influence, F(1, 127) = 10.02, p < .01, ?p2 = .07, and of 
SVO, F(1, 127) = 20.32, p < .001, ?p2 = .14, and there was a 
significant two-way interaction of Emotion condition and SVO, F(1, 
127) = 8.64, p < .01. More importantly, the results showed a 
significant three-way interaction, F(1, 127) = 9.17, p < .01, ?p2 = 
.07. The effects of shame on prosocial behavior differed for 
prosocials and proselfs, depending on Emotion influence. 
Prosocials and proselfs did not contribute more in the Exogenous 
Shame condition compared to the Exogenous Control condition. 
Proselfs also did not contribute more in the Exogenous Shame 
condition compared to the Endogenous Control condition, t(65) = 
1.14, ns. 
 
Endogenous shame did influence prosocial behavior. Proselfs in 
the Endogenous Shame condition contributed more to the 
interaction partner than proselfs in the Endogenous Control 
condition and proselfs in the Exogenous Control condition, t(65) = 
3.72, p < .001. A contrast analysis of Endogenous Shame versus 
Exogenous Shame, Endogenous Control, and Exogenous Control 
also showed that proselfs acted more prosocially when 
experiencing endogenous shame, t(127) = 4.73, p < .001. For 
prosocials, there was no difference between Endogenous Shame 
and Endogenous Control, or between Endogenous Shame and 
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Exogenous Control, t(62) = 1.53, ns. A contrast analysis of 
Endogenous Shame versus Exogenous Shame, Endogenous 
Control, and Exogenous Control also showed no differences for 
prosocials, t(127) = 0.44, ns. Thus, while exogenous shame did 
not influence prosocial behavior, endogenous shame did motivate 
prosocial behavior for proselfs.  
 
Unexpectedly, prosocials in the Exogenous Shame condition 
contributed less than prosocials in the Endogenous Control 
condition, t(62) = 2.70, p < .01. This finding might be explained by 
the manipulation used. In the Shame condition, 34 % of the 
prosocials reported the other to be an unknown other and 34 % to 
be a friend or colleague. In the Control condition, 50 % of the 
prosocials reported the other to be a close relative or their partner. 
This difference was significant, ?²(2, N = 107) = 6.09, p < .05. 
Furthermore, in the Exogenous conditions, participants interacted 
with an unknown other. Thus, it is likely that prosocials acted less 
prosocially in the Exogenous Shame condition because they 
interacted with unknown others, while in the Endogenous Control 
condition they interacted with close relatives or their partner.  
 
To summarize, the findings of Experiment 3.1 were replicated with 
a different shame induction. Again the data revealed that only 
endogenous shame motivates prosocial behavior for proselfs. 
Even though these two previous studies employed emotion 
inductions that are commonly used in literature, the credibility of 
the findings would be much increased if shame was 
experimentally induced. Therefore, we conducted Experiment 3.3.  
 
 
Experiment 3.3 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design. One hundred sixty-three undergraduate 
students of Tilburg University participated in this Experiment in 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement. After exclusion of five 
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participants who could not be classified as prosocial or proself, 
158 participants remained (47 males and 111 females, Mage = 
19.88, SD = 3.38). There were 89 prosocials and 69 proselfs in the 
sample.  
 
Procedure and Variables. Participants entered the laboratory in 
groups of eight to twelve participants. They were seated in 
separate cubicles and informed that they would form groups with 
three other participants present. The participants would be 
connected to the other group members through their computer. 
The session started with two intelligence tests. Participants were 
told that the intelligence tests were meant to see whether group 
members were comparable in knowledge and academic abilities. 
In total, participants could earn 20 points on the two intelligence 
tests. In the first test, participants answered ten general 
knowledge questions (adopted from Van Harreveld, Van Der Pligt, 
Nordgren, & Claassen, in press). For every good answer, 
participants received one point. In the second test, English 
language skills were examined by ten items, where every good 
answer counted as one point.  
 
Following the intelligence tests, the computer calculated the 
number of points earned by each group member. In the meantime 
participants were told that their score would give insight into their 
academic abilities and their chances of obtaining an academic 
degree. They were explained that a score below 12 points 
indicated (highly) insufficient abilities, between 12 and 16 points 
indicated normal abilities, and a score above 16 points indicated 
(highly) sufficient abilities. After the explanation, participants 
publicly received bogus feedback about their performance. In the 
Shame Condition, all group members saw on their computer 
screen that the participant earned 9 points (insufficient) while the 
other group members earned 19 (highly sufficient), 17 (sufficient), 
and 16 points (normal/sufficient). In the Control condition, the 
participants earned 16 points (normal/sufficient), similar to the 
points earned by the other group members (19, 17, and 16 points). 
Note that in the Control condition, although they received an 
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average number of 16 points, participants still had the lowest 
score in the group. This makes our experiment a conservative test 
of the effects of shame.  
 
After the feedback, participants continued with the 10-coin give-
some dilemma game with a student from another group who knew 
nothing about the intelligence score of the participant (Exogenous 
condition) or with a student from the same group who knew about 
the intelligence scores (Endogenous condition). As a manipulation 
check participants responded to the same items as in Experiment 
3.2.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation checks showed that the 
manipulation of shame was successful. Participants in the Shame 
condition scored significantly higher on all elements of shame 
compared to the Control condition, all ts(156) > 8.75, all ps < .001. 
Furthermore, participants in the Shame condition felt significantly 
more shame (M = 6.90, SD = 1.66) than participants in the Control 
condition (M = 1.25, SD = 1.27), t(156) = 23.92, p < .001, and 
significantly more shame than any other emotion, all ts(81) > 8.08, 
all ps < .001. There were no differences between emotion 
conditions on the other assessed emotions. 
 
Prosocial behavior. Results for prosocial behavior are displayed in 
Table 3.1. The findings again supported our hypothesis. A 2 
(Emotion condition) × 2 (Emotion influence) × 2 (SVO) ANOVA 
with prosocial behavior as dependent variable showed a main 
effect of SVO, F(1, 150) = 10.80, p < .01, ?p2 = .07, no significant 
two-way interactions, all Fs(1, 150) < 2.41, ns, and a significant 
three-way interaction, F(1, 150) = 3.78, p = .05, ?p2 = .03. The 
effects of shame on prosocial behavior differed for prosocials and 
proselfs, dependent upon Emotion influence. Prosocials and 
proselfs did not contribute significantly more in the Exogenous 
Shame condition compared to the Exogenous Control condition or 
compared to the Endogenous Control condition, t(85) = 0.78, ns, 
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and t(65) = 0.19, ns, respectively.  
 
Endogenous shame did influence prosocial behavior. Proselfs in 
the Endogenous Shame condition contributed more to the 
interaction partner than proselfs in the Endogenous Control 
condition and proselfs in the Exogenous Control condition, t(65) = 
1.69, p = .09. A contrast analysis of Endogenous Shame versus 
Exogenous Shame, Endogenous Control, and Exogenous Control 
also showed that proselfs acted more prosocially, t(150) = 2.54, p 
< .05. For prosocials, there was no difference between 
Endogenous Shame and Endogenous Control, or between 
Endogenous Shame and Exogenous Control, t(85) = 0.85, ns. A 
contrast analysis of Endogenous Shame versus Exogenous 
Shame, Endogenous Control, and Exogenous Control also 
showed no differences for prosocials, t(150) = 1.05, ns.  
 
The results of Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 were thus replicated using 
a performance situation in the lab. The data revealed that only 
endogenous shame motivated prosocial behavior for proselfs, 
while exogenous shame had no influence on prosocial behavior. In 
Experiments 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 a social dilemma game was used to 
measure prosocial behavior. To extend these findings beyond 
social dilemma situations, Experiment 3.4 was conducted. In this 
experiment, shame was induced with the scenario used in 
Experiment 3.1 and prosocial tendencies were measured in 
everyday situations.  
 
 
Experiment 3.4 
 
Method 
 
Participants. One hundred seventy undergraduate students at 
Avans University Breda and at Tilburg University volunteered to 
participate in this experiment. After exclusion of twenty participants 
who could not be classified as prosocial or proself, 150  
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participants remained (43 males and 107 females, Mage = 20.03, 
SD = 3.83). There were 71 prosocials and 79 proselfs in the 
sample.  
 
Design. Participants first read the scenario used in Experiment 3.1 
and subsequently rated how much shame, pride, guilt, fear, and 
sadness they would feel in this situation (ranging from 0, not at all, 
to 10, very strongly). Next, participants continued with the 
Prosocial Tendencies Scale, the dependent measure. This 9-item 
scale is a measure of everyday prosocial tendencies and helping 
(Chapter 2). We adapted the Prosocial Tendencies Scale for the 
Endogenous and Exogenous condition. For each item, participants 
were asked to report how much they wanted to undertake that 
action directly after the scenario. In the Exogenous condition, the 
items concerned a fellow student who had not seen the 
presentation. In the Endogenous condition, the items concerned a 
fellow student who had seen the presentation. Two example items 
are “I would like to comfort the student when (s)he is emotionally 
upset” and “I would like to help the student while others are 
watching me”. All items were rated on 11-point scales ranging 
from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). A Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis on the nine items showed a clear one factor solution with 
an Eigenvalue of 5.08 (second and third Eigenvalues were 1.40 
and 0.68). The factor explained 56% of the variance and the nine 
items formed a reliable scale (α = .90).  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The manipulation check showed that the emotion induction was 
successful. Participants in the Shame condition reported 
significantly more shame (M = 8.68, SD = 1.44) than participants 
in the Control condition (M = 2.11, SD = 2.36), t(148) = 21.37, p < 
.001, and reported significantly more shame than the other 
reported emotions, all ts(87) > 11.15, all ps < .001.  
 
Results for prosocial behavior are displayed in Table 3.2. A 2 
(Emotion condition) × 2 (Emotion influence) × 2 (SVO) ANOVA 
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with prosocial behavior as dependent variable showed a main 
effect of SVO, F(1, 142) = 3.93, p = .05, ?p2 = .03, no significant 
two-way interactions, all Fs(1, 142) < 3.00, ns, and a significant 
three-way interaction, F(1, 142) = 4.21, p < .05, ?p2 = .03. The 
effects of shame on prosocial behavior differed for prosocials and 
proselfs, depending on Emotion influence. Prosocials and proselfs 
did not score higher in the Exogenous Shame condition compared 
to the Exogenous Control condition or compared to the 
Endogenous Control condition, t(67) = 0.63, ns, and t(75) = 0.07, 
ns, respectively. 
 
Endogenous shame did influence prosocial behavior. Proselfs in 
the Endogenous Shame condition had a higher score than 
proselfs in the Endogenous Control condition and proselfs in the 
Exogenous Control condition, t(75) = 2.14, p < .05. A contrast 
analysis of Endogenous Shame versus Exogenous Shame, 
Endogenous Control, and Exogenous Control also showed that 
proselfs had a higher score when experiencing endogenous 
 
Table 3.2 
Prosocial Behavior as a Function of Emotion Condition, Emotion Influence, and 
SVO (Social Value Orientation) in Experiment 3.4 
 
Emotion condition 
 
SVO 
Emotion influence 
Shame 
M (SD)  
Control 
M (SD) 
Prosocial    
Exogenous 5.63 (1.64) = 5.49 (1.89) 
Endogenous 5.25 (1.89) = 5.28 (1.19) 
Proself    
Exogenous 4.33 (1.75) = 4.78 (1.84) 
Endogenous 5.99 (1.42) > 4.29 (2.23) 
Note. Prosocial behavior reflects the mean score on the nine cooperation items, 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). Higher scores indicate more 
prosocial behavior. There are no significant differences between means 
separated by an “=” mark with all ts < .80, all ps > .43. The two means 
separated by an “>” mark are significantly different with t(75) = 3.07, p < .01. 
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shame, t(142) = 3.59, p < .001. For prosocials, there was no 
difference between Endogenous Shame and Endogenous Control, 
or between Endogenous Shame and Exogenous Control, t(67) = 
0.40, ns. The contrast analysis also showed no differences for 
prosocials, t(142) = 0.47, ns.  
 
Taken together, endogenous shame also motivates prosocial 
tendencies in everyday situations for proselfs. Exogenous shame 
does not motivate prosocial tendencies. These results obtained 
with the different measure of prosocial behavior replicate the 
results of Experiments 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
As ugly and negative as shame experiences can be, feeling this 
emotion can have clear positive consequences for interpersonal 
behavior. Shame can act as a commitment device, motivating 
people to act prosocially and thereby committing them to long-term 
strategies. This prosocial behavior benefits other’s well-being and 
improves social relationships. Thus, shame does have a 
constructive interpersonal function. 
 
Four experiments clearly support the notion that shame serves an 
interpersonal function. Using three different emotion inductions 
and two different dependent measures, we repeatedly found that 
endogenous shame motivates prosocial behavior. After imagining 
shame with a scenario, proself participants acted more prosocially 
towards the audience in a social dilemma game (Experiment 3.1). 
This finding was replicated when participants recalled a shame 
event (Experiment 3.2). Moreover, when experiencing shame after 
a failure on performance tasks, proself participants also acted 
prosocially towards audience in the lab (Experiment 3.3). Finally, 
Experiment 3.4 showed that this effect could be generalized 
beyond social dilemmas to helping tendencies in everyday 
situations. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that shame can be 
seen as a moral emotion motivating prosocial behavior.  
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Given that these experiments are the first empirical evidence for 
prosocial effects of shame, it is only sensible to ask why these 
effects were not found earlier. We think that there are at least 
three reasons for this. First, shame research has mainly focused 
on the correlates of shame-proneness and not on effects of 
situational experiences of shame (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1994; Harder 
et al., 1992). Shame-proneness is generally related to a wide array 
of negative psychological conditions and behaviors (for an 
overview see Tangney & Fischer, 1995). However, while shame-
proneness and situational experiences of shame are related, they 
do not have similar behavioral effects (e.g., Allan et al., 1994; 
Rüsch et al., 2007). Findings for shame-proneness can therefore 
not be generalized to behavioral effects of situational experiences 
of shame. Second, in line with the view of shame as an ugly 
emotion, studies on effects of situational experiences of shame 
have mainly focused on action tendencies like social withdrawal 
(e.g., Tangney et al., 1996; Wicker et al., 1983). Effects of 
situational experiences of shame on behaviors other than 
withdrawal tendencies have simply not been addressed. Third, the 
one exception that did focus on behavior other than withdrawal 
tendencies, namely the studies on prosocial behavior reported in 
Chapter 2, used only exogenous influences of shame and 
therefore found no effects. By moving beyond shame-proneness 
and withdrawal tendencies, and focusing on endogenous 
influences of shame on prosocial behavior, our experiments 
contribute to our understanding of the behavioral effects of shame.  
 
We hasten to say that, even though the results showed that 
shame is a moral emotion motivating prosocial behavior, they are 
not at variance with the view of shame as an ugly emotion. If 
anything, we believe that the two views can easily be reconciled. 
In line with the ugly view, experiences of shame are often 
unpleasant, giving rise to a wide array of negative intrapersonal 
thoughts and feelings (e.g., Ausubel, 1955; Tangney, 1991). The 
moral view additionally suggests that these negative experiences 
induce people to engage in prosocial behavior. Negative, self-
conscious emotions act as commitment devices precisely because 
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they raise the costs of selfish behavior. This benefits people by 
committing them to long-term strategies and it benefits others by 
increasing their well-being (Frank, 1988). The present experiments 
thus lend empirical credibility to Adam Smith’s claim that “moral 
sentiments are sufficient for the harmony of society” (p. 23). 
 
Two alternative explanations might be given for the prosocial 
effects of shame. One could be that shame motivates prosocial 
behavior as an appeasement strategy (e.g., Tangney & Fischer, 
1995). The reasoning behind this explanation would be that 
shame, arising after violation of a social norm, motivates 
appeasement behaviors in order to avoid conflicts. Another 
explanation is that shame motivates prosocial behavior in order to 
boost social esteem (Goldberg, 1991). The person would be 
motivated to boost the damaged self that has been caused by the 
shame experience. However, neither alternative is supported by 
the findings of Experiment 3.4. If shame motivated prosocial 
behavior in order to appease or to boost social esteem, stronger 
prosocial behavior would be expected with an audience than 
without an audience. However, participants in the endogenous 
shame condition preferred “helping the student when (s)he does 
not know who is helping” (M=5.78, SD=2.20) above “helping the 
student while I get in the spotlight as a consequence” (M=4.51, SD 
=2.21), t(40)=3.24, p<.01, and preferred “helping the student when 
(s)he does not know who is helping” (M=5.78, SD=2.20) above 
“helping the student while others are watching the way I do 
everything” (M=4.83, SD=2.40), t(40)=2.52, p<.01. In our view, the 
view of shame as a commitment device provides the most 
parsimonious explanation of the prosocial effects found in our 
experiments. 
 
Importantly, we want to stress the fact that the present findings 
cannot be attributed to general negative affect or negative mood. It 
is the case that there is much research attesting to the fact that 
people act prosocially when they are sad or experiencing a bad 
mood. They may do so because acting prosocially can be a 
reinforcing, mood-enhancing experience. For example, people are 
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more willing to collect donations for a charity after a bogus 
aptitude test (Weyant, 1978), they help more after reminiscing 
about unhappy events or after reading a series of depressing 
statements (Cialdini, Kenrick, & Baumann, 1982), and they 
donated more money to all kinds of charities after the fearful 
events of September 11, 2001 (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & 
Schroeder, 2005). None of the mood-management theories 
differentiates between endogenous and exogenous affect and 
much of the empirical work showed increased prosocial behavior 
induced by negative affect stemming from unrelated events 
(exogenous affect, using our terminology). In that light it is 
important to realize that we had strong theoretical reasons to 
predict only effects of endogenous shame, and not of exogenous 
shame, and only for proselfs, not for prosocials. We are not aware 
of a model or theory that would be consistent with this specific 
pattern of results. In addition, when we computed a measure of 
general negative affect, by averaging all negative emotions that 
were assessed, we found that there were no significant differences 
between the endogenous shame and exogenous shame 
conditions. Thus, the behavioral differences that we obtained 
across four experimental studies could not be explained in terms 
of general negative affect. 
 
Although the present experiments show that shame is a moral 
emotion similar to guilt, we do not mean to imply that shame and 
guilt are identical emotions. Shame and guilt are both moral 
emotions that motivate prosocial behavior. They both act as 
commitment devices and can have similar behavioral effects. 
Nonetheless, the phenomenological experiences and 
psychological origins of shame and guilt are clearly distinct. 
Shame arises after a negative evaluation of the self, reflecting the 
appraisal that something is wrong or defective with one’s core self 
(Lewis, 1971). It activates a focus on others’ thoughts about 
oneself and on being accepted by the group. In contrast, guilt 
arises after an evaluation of the behavior, reflecting the appraisal 
that one has caused harm, loss, or distress to a relationship 
partner (Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006; Tangney et al., 1996). 
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Indeed, guilt appears to be strongest in dyadic, communal 
relationships, activating a focus on the hurt other and behavior to 
maintain and enhance the dyadic relationship (Baumeister et al., 
1994). Thus, shame and guilt are clearly distinct moral emotions, 
although they both motivate prosocial behavior. 
 
The distinction that we made between endogenous and 
exogenous emotions is important for emotion research. The 
distinction has been made theoretically (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2006), but our studies are the first to simultaneously examine the 
endogenous and exogenous influences of an emotion. For some 
emotions, exogenous and endogenous influences may be similar. 
For example Ketelaar and Au (2003) showed that exogenous 
influences of guilt in one study and endogenous influences of guilt 
in another study both led to increased prosocial behavior. 
However, for other emotions such as shame the distinction can 
explain important differences in observed behavior. For shame, 
the distinction is important due to its different action tendencies. 
Being in a situation unrelated to the shame event already 
(partially) fulfills the action tendency of shame to withdraw. In 
contrast, being in situations related to the shame event leave the 
action tendencies of shame unfulfilled. Therefore, exogenous 
influences of shame do not have the same prosocial effects as 
endogenous influences of shame. In view of these results it seems 
safe to suggest that, for a complete understanding of the functions 
of emotions, studies of both exogenous and endogenous 
influences are necessary.  
 
Taken together, shame has been understood as a social emotion, 
as an ugly emotion, and as a moral emotion. Until now empirical 
research has been guided primarily by the ugly view, drawing 
attention to a focus on the negative consequences of shame. This 
left students of emotion wondering whether shame had any 
function at all. At present, we argue that this paradox is solvable. 
The current findings suggest an important interpersonal function of 
shame: shame can act as a commitment device motivating 
prosocial behavior. Shame may not be so ugly after all. 
3 This chapter is based on De Hooge, Zeelenberg & Breugelmans (2008)       71 
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Restore and Protect Motivations  
 
Following Shame3 
 
 
Imagine that you make a silly mistake during a ballroom dance 
exam, a so-called faux-pass, and you experience intense shame 
(you feel that you look like a fool). If you were offered a chance to 
redo the exam, would you take it to prove that you are indeed 
capable, or would you forego this opportunity to avoid further 
mistakes? At present, shame research cannot provide a clear 
answer to this question. Empirical research has produced 
seemingly opposing results that shame theories have not been 
able to explain or accommodate; both approach and withdrawal 
tendencies have been found to be associated with shame (Frijda, 
Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Tangney, 
Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). 
Based on a review of the shame literature one may be inclined to 
conclude that shame is a complex emotion that is not yet properly 
understood. In this article we aim to show that feelings of shame, 
and the way that these feelings manifest themselves in 
motivations and behavior, are actually quite simple as soon as one 
takes a pragmatic stance with respect to this emotion. The core 
idea is that shame reflects concerns with a threatened self and 
motivates behaviors to restore a positive view of the self. We 
present the results of a series of five experiments that are 
consistent with this idea and that allow for an integration of the 
apparently contrasting results from previous studies on shame. 
We think our account of shame provides a new and essential 
insight in how this important self-conscious emotion works.  
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Shame: A Complex Emotion? 
 
Shame is perhaps the most important self-conscious emotion (M. 
Lewis, 2000; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984), playing a role in many 
personal and interpersonal aspects such as self-esteem, shyness, 
eating disturbances, depression, development, and self-regulation 
(Erikson, 1963; Harder, 1995; Harder, Cutler, & Rockart, 1992; 
Sanftner, Barlow, Marschall, & Tangney, 1995). It is an 
overwhelming emotion that is associated with feelings of 
worthlessness, inferiority, and of a damaged self-image (Ausubel, 
1955; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). Experiences of 
shame mainly arise after moral transgressions or incompetences 
and are characterized by confusion in thought, inability to speak, 
and rumination (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Miller, 1995; Orth, 
Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006). Even though there is a fair amount of 
knowledge about shame experiences, it is unclear what behaviors 
follow shame. What do people do when they experience shame?  
 
There seems to be no simple answer to this question, because the 
few existing empirical studies on shame-induced behaviors have 
found contradicting results. On the one hand, studies suggest that 
shame promotes withdrawal and avoidance behaviors. For 
example, Scherer and Wallbott (1994) found that shame was 
characterized by stronger withdrawal tendencies compared to 
other emotions such as joy, anger, disgust, sadness, and fear. On 
the other hand, there are studies that suggest that shame can 
promote approach behaviors. For example, Tangney et al. (1996) 
showed that shame activated a higher willingness to make 
amends than to hide. In Chapter 3, we found that shame can 
activate prosocial behavior towards the audience of a shameful 
event. There are also studies that have reported inconclusive 
evidence. For example, Wicker et al. (1983) showed that shame 
experiences were rated neutral on an item ranging from wanting to 
hide to making restitutions. Frijda et al. (1989) even found that 
shame activated both a desire to disappear from view and a desire 
to undo the situation compared to guilt and regret.  
 
Restore and protect motivations following shame 
73 
Emotion scholars have not been able to explain how shame can 
activate such contrasting behaviors. Emotion theory assumes that 
emotions function by giving information about a specific problem to 
be dealt with and by prioritizing behaviors to deal with these 
problems (Frijda, 1986; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). The idea is 
that emotions activate a distinct motivation, which then activates 
behaviors so as to solve the problem (Plutchik, 1962; Roseman, 
1984, Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). Most, 
if not all, shame theories state that shame activates withdrawal or 
avoidance behaviors, but remain silent about the motivation 
underlying these behaviors. In addition, these theories do not 
consider the possible activation of approach behaviors (e.g., 
Fessler, 2004; Gilbert, 2003; H. B. Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991; 
Wurmser, 1987). Together, this provides a picture of shame as 
being a complex and possibly misunderstood emotion. Below we 
present a solution for understanding these complex matters by 
providing a more parsimonious explanation of shame. 
 
 
Shame: Dealing With the Threatened Self 
 
One of the most important fundamental human motives is the 
desire to have a positive self view (e.g., Alexander & Knight, 1971; 
Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Taylor & Brown, 1988). People compare 
themselves to others, make self-serving attributions, and they 
react defensively or act assertively to achieve and maintain such a 
positive view (Gibbons, 1990). When experiencing shame, it is 
exactly this positive view of the self that is threatened (H. B. Lewis, 
1971). After a moral transgression or incompetence, the self is 
painfully scrutinized and negatively evaluated, and “the person in 
the midst of the shame reaction is concerned with the implications 
of negative events for the self” (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 63). 
Taking a pragmatic stance, we suggest that all motivations and 
behaviors following from shame are focused on dealing with the 
threatened self.  
 
More specifically, we predict that the behaviors following from 
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shame are first and foremost approach behaviors. Because having 
a positive self view is a fundamental motive, people experiencing 
shame will be motivated to restore that positive self view. This 
restore motivation will elicit approach behaviors such as entering 
achievement situations, performing new challenges, and 
undertaking reparative actions. For example, after failing the 
dance exam, one probably finds oneself to be eager to try again. 
According to Izard (1977): “The effort to repair and strengthen the 
self after experiencing intense shame often continues for several 
days or weeks...the processes can lead to a sense of adequacy 
and enhance self-identity” (p. 404).  
 
An important question is, of course, how to reconcile our proposal 
with the observation that many studies have found that shame is 
associated with a tendency to withdraw or other avoidance 
behaviors. We think that the answer can be found in the type of 
data that produces such effects. Findings suggesting withdrawal or 
avoidance primarily stem from research studying the correlates of 
chronic shame or shame-proneness (e.g., Gilbert, Pehl, & Allan, 
1994; Harder et al., 1992; Tangney, 1990; Thompson, Altmann, & 
Davidson, 2004). Because it is very hard, if not impossible, to 
restore a chronically threatened self, the second best alternative is 
to withdraw from situations that are likely to produce even more 
shame. Indeed, the empirical studies showing approach 
tendencies all report on discrete experiences of shame rather than 
chronic or trait related shame (e.g., Chapter 3; Tangney et al., 
1996).  
 
This reasoning leads to another, testable prediction. We expect 
shame to elicit behaviors to cope with the threatened self, which 
will initially be approach behaviors to restore the self. However, 
when for any reason it is impossible or too risky to restore the self, 
shame will motivate withdrawal behaviors instead of approach 
behaviors to protect the threatened self from more possible harm, 
similar to what happens with chronic shame. For example, if there 
are only competitions with top dancers to participate in, one will 
probably not participate in order to protect one’s sports image from 
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another loss. Thus, shame “can prompt behaviors to protect the 
self from additional scrutiny or self-threatening exposure” 
(Ferguson, 2005, p. 378). 
 
To summarize, we suggest that shame activates behaviors to deal 
with a threatened self, which will be approach behaviors to restore 
the self. When these actions are not possible or too risky, shame 
will activate withdrawal behaviors to protect the self. In other 
words, shame has two motives, a restore and a protect motive, 
and situational factors will determine which behavior follows 
shame. 
 
Five studies with different shame inductions and different 
measures of behavior were conducted in order to test our 
predictions. The first four studies tested whether shame indeed 
activates both a restore and a protect motive and whether these 
motives predict behavior. Willingness to perform (Studies 4.1 and 
4.2), achievement approach and avoidance (Study 4.3), and 
intentions to hide and to repair (Study 4.4) were used as 
behavioral measures to test whether shame activates more 
approach than withdrawal behaviors. We expected shame to 
activate both restore and protect motives, and we expected these 
motives to mediate the effect of shame on approach behavior. 
Study 4.5 introduced the situational factor of local competency in 
order to test the hypothesized situational influence. Past research 
has shown that when people are highly competent, they will more 
easily enter approach situations than when they have low 
competency (Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, we expected shame to 
motivate approach behavior in situations where participants 
perceived themselves as competent, and to motivate withdrawal 
behavior in situations where they perceived themselves as 
incompetent.  
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Study 4.1 
 
Method  
 
Participants. Two hundred fourteen undergraduate students at 
Tilburg University (64 males and 150 females, Mage = 19.24, SD = 
1.82) participated in a series of unrelated studies in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the Shame or the Control condition.  
 
Procedure and variables. Participants were asked to: “Imagine you 
are following a course where everybody has to give a presentation 
in a work group. In the work group, 25 fellow students are 
present.” In the Shame condition participants then read: 
 
When you have to give your presentation everything goes completely 
wrong. You stumble over your own words, your story is muddled, and at 
the end it is clear that nobody understood what you were trying to tell. 
After your presentation has finished some people from the audience ask 
you questions. Then it becomes clear that you have no mastery over the 
subject at all.  
 
In the Control condition participants read: “When you have to give 
your presentation everything goes normal. Your presentation is 
equally good as the presentations of the other students and in no 
way you stand out.” A pretest of these materials with a different 
group of students (N = 123, Mage = 22) showed that participants in 
the Shame condition reported significantly more shame (on a 
scale ranging from 0, not at all, to 10, very strongly) (M = 8.95, SD 
= 1.13) than Control participants, (M = 2.06, SD = 2.37), t(121) = 
21.70, p < .001.After the emotion induction, participants read:  
 
At the end of the meeting the teacher says that the content of the next 
meeting group is not clear yet. Anybody who wants to can give another 
presentation. You consider whether you want to do this. On the one 
hand, this is your opportunity to give a good presentation. On the other 
hand, it also could go wrong. What would you do? 
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Participants then indicated whether or not they would give the 
presentation (Performance choice) and indicated the extent to 
which they wanted to give the presentation (Willingness to 
perform) on an 11-point scale (0 = not at all, 10 = very much). 
Next, participants answered ten items concerning the motivation 
underlying their choice to give the second presentation or not. 
These items were specifically developed to measure the restore 
and protect motives. A Factor Analysis with Varimax rotation on 
the ten items showed a clear two factor solution (see Appendix 4.1 
for the items and factor loadings). The first factor, Restore 
(Eigenvalue = 5.22), explained 50% of the variance and formed a 
reliable scale (α = .96). The second factor, Protect (Eigenvalue = 
3.26), explained 31% of the variance and formed a reliable scale 
(α = .95). For each item, participants were asked to indicate the 
extent to which this motivated their choice (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
strongly). After completion of all tasks participants were thanked 
and debriefed. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The results of Study 4.1 and of the next four studies are displayed 
in Table 4.1. We hypothesized shame to activate both Restore and 
Protect. Furthermore, we expected these two motives to mediate 
the effect of shame on willingness to perform.  
 
The findings supported our hypotheses. Participants in the Shame 
condition scored significantly higher on Restore, t(213) = 5.48, p < 
.001, and on Protect than participants in the Control condition, 
t(213) = 2.12, p < .05. There was no difference between Restore 
and Protect in the Shame condition, t(82) = 0.98, p = .33.  
 
More participants in the Shame condition wanted to engage in a 
new performance (41%) compared to participants in the Control 
condition (18%), ?²(1, N = 216) = 12.99, p < .001. Similarly, an 
independent samples t-test with Emotion condition as independent 
variable and Willingness to perform as dependent variable showed 
that participants in the Shame condition wanted to perform more 
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(M = 4.05, SD = 3.26) than participants in the Control condition, (M 
= 3.07, SD = 2.42), t(213) = 2.12, p < .05. 
 
Restore and Protect significantly predicted Performance choice 
and Willingness to perform. Logistic regression analysis showed 
significant effects of Restore and Protect on Performance choice, 
Wald(1) = 42.27, p < .001, and Wald(1) = 24.39, p < .001, 
respectively. Linear regression analysis showed that Restore and 
Protect had significant effects on Willingness to perform, ? = .63, p 
< .01 and ? = -.35, p < .01, respectively.  
 
More importantly, Restore and Protect fully mediated the effects of 
Emotion condition on Performance choice and on Willingness to 
perform. The significant effect of Emotion condition on 
Performance choice, Wald(1) = 12.869, p < .001, became 
nonsignificant when Restore and Protect were added in the 
regression, Wald(1) = 1.34, p = .25. The effects of Restore and 
Protect stayed significant, Wald(1) = 37.27, p < .001, and Wald(1) 
= 25.48, p < .001, respectively. The effect of Emotion condition on 
Willingness to perform, ? = .18, p < .01, became nonsignificant 
when Restore and Protect were added in the regression, ? = .01, p 
= .88. The effects of Restore and Protect stayed significant, ? = 
.62, p < .01 and ? = -.35, p < .01, respectively. Sobel tests 
supported these findings, Zrestore= 5.11, p < .001 and Zprotect = 2.07, 
p < .05. 
 
In summary, the findings of Study 4.1 provide the first support for 
the hypothesis that shame activates both a protect and a restore 
motive. In addition, the findings reveal that shame motivates 
performance behavior, an effect that is mediated by the restore 
and protect motives. We conducted Study 4.2 to replicate the 
findings of Study 4.1 with a different induction of shame.  
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Study 4.2 
 
Method  
 
Participants. Sixty five undergraduate students at Tilburg 
University (19 males and 46 females, Mage = 19.63, SD = 2.52) 
participated in a series of unrelated studies in partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
Shame or Control condition.  
 
Procedure and variables. For our emotion induction manipulation, 
participants were asked to complete a questionnaire that was 
placed next to the computer. This questionnaire was adopted from 
Chapter 2 and Ketelaar and Au (2003). The Dutch emotion word 
“schaamte” was used for the English emotion word “shame.” 
Cross-cultural research shows that “schaamte” refers to similar 
experiences as the English shame (Breugelmans & Poortinga, 
2006; Fontaine et al., 2006). In the Shame condition, participants 
were asked to report a personal experience in which they felt very 
ashamed. They wrote, for example, about failing an exam, a bad 
performance in sports, or behaving inappropriately while being 
drunk. In the Control condition, participants were asked to 
describe a regular weekday. Participants worked for approximately 
10 minutes on the emotion induction task and then continued with 
the following scenario:  
 
Imagine that you participate in an experiment directly after the event that 
you described. In this experiment, the experimenter offers you a choice. 
You can either choose to do some performance tasks to test your 
general abilities or you can choose not to do the tasks (in which case 
you will do something else). You consider whether you want to do this. 
On the one hand, this is your opportunity to show your abilities. On the 
other hand, it also could go wrong. What would you do? 
 
Participants indicated the extent to which they wanted to fulfil the 
performance tasks (Willingness to perform, 0 = not at all, 10 = very 
much). Next, participants responded to the motivation items used 
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in Study 4.1 (αrestore = .92, and αprotect = .91). As a manipulation 
check, participants then reread their situation description and 
indicated how small they felt, how alone they felt, how much they 
felt that all attention was drawn towards them, how much they did 
not want others to know about the described event, and how much 
they were worried about what others would think of them. These 
items are described in the emotion literature as basic elements of 
experiences of shame (Caplovitz Barrett, 1995; Roseman, Wiest, 
& Swartz, 1994; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Subsequently, 
participants rated how much shame they felt in the situation or in 
the normal weekday. We also asked participants to indicate how 
much guilt, regret, sadness, fear, and anger they felt in the 
situation (0 = not at all, 10 = very strongly).  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Manipulation Check. The manipulation of shame was successful: 
participants in the Shame condition scored significantly higher on 
all basic elements of shame compared to participants in the 
Control condition, all ts(63) > 6.69, all ps < .001. They also felt 
significantly more shame (M = 8.90, SD = 1.27) than participants 
in the Control condition (M = 1.18, SD = 1.47), t(63) = 22.41, p < 
.001, and felt significantly more shame than other emotions, all 
ts(31) > 3.06, all ps < .01. There were no differences between the 
conditions on the other emotions.  
 
Motivations. As in Study 4.1, we expected shame to activate 
Restore and Protect motives, which mediate the effect of shame 
on Willingness to perform. The findings supported our hypotheses: 
participants in the Shame condition scored significantly higher on 
Restore, t(63) = 5.37, p < .001, and on Protect than participants in 
the Control condition, t(63) = 4.82, p < .001. Restore was 
significantly higher than Protect in the Shame condition, t(31) = 
4.86, p < .001.  
 
Performance. Participants in the Shame condition wanted to 
perform more (M = 6.03, SD = 1.88) than participants in the 
Restore and protect motivations following shame 
81 
Control condition, (M = 4.97, SD = 2.19), t(63) = 2.10, p < .05. This 
behavior was predicted by Restore and Protect: linear regression 
analysis showed that Restore had a positive effect, ? = .63, p < 
.001, and Protect had a negative effect on Willingness to perform, 
? = -.28, p < .01. More importantly, the effect of Emotion condition 
on Willingness to perform was fully mediated by Restore and 
Protect. The effect of Emotion condition, ? = .26, p < .05, became 
nonsignificant when Restore and Protect were added in the 
regression, ? = .08, p = .57. The effects of Restore and Protect 
stayed significant, ? = .63, p < .001 and ? = -.40, p < .01, 
respectively. The Sobel tests showed that the mediation was 
mainly due to Restore: Zrestore= 3.27, p < .01 and Zprotect = 1.36, p = 
.17. 
 
To summarize, the findings of Study 4.1 were replicated with a 
different induction of shame. Shame activated approach behavior, 
namely the intention to perform, not only to protect one’s self view 
but mainly to restore one’s self view. In Study 4.3, achievement 
approach and avoidance tendencies were measured to see 
whether protect and restore motives also predict behaviors other 
than choosing whether to perform or not. 
 
 
Study 4.3 
 
Method  
 
Participants. Forty nine undergraduate students at Tilburg 
University (8 males and 41 females, Mage = 19.12, SD = 1.84) 
participated in a series of unrelated studies in partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement. 
 
Procedure and variables. All participants read the shame scenario 
of Study 4.1. As manipulation check, participants rated how much 
shame, pride, guilt, and fear they would feel in the described 
situation (0 = not at all, 10 = very strongly). Next, participants 
indicated for each of eight activities how likely it was they would 
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engage in that activity directly after the shame event. This was the 
dependent measure. Achievement approach and Achievement 
avoidance were measured with eight items selected from the trait 
measure Mehrabian Achievement Motivation Questionnaire 
(Mehrabian, 1969). All items were rated on 11-point scales (0 = 
very unlikely, 10 = very likely). A Factor Analysis on the eight 
items showed a clear two factor solution (see Appendix 4.2 for the 
items and factor loadings). The first factor, Achievement approach 
(Eigenvalue = 4.52), explained 53% of the variance and formed a 
reliable scale (α = .81). The second factor, Achievement 
avoidance (Eigenvalue = 1.34), explained 12% of the variance and 
formed a reliable scale (α = .92). After the Achievement Scale, 
participants continued with the motivation items measuring 
Restore (α = .88) and Protect (α = .83).  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We hypothesized that shame would motivate more approach than 
avoidance of achievement situations, and that these behaviors 
would be predicted by restore and protect. The induction worked: 
Participants reported significantly more shame (M = 9.14, SD = 
0.89) than the other emotions, all ts(48) > 8.61, all ps < .001. 
Participants scored equally high on Restore and on Protect, t(48) 
= 0.35, p = .73, and scored significantly higher on Achievement 
approach (M = 5.81, SD = 1.71) than on Achievement avoidance, 
(M = 4.41, SD = 2.64), t(48) = 2.54, p < .05.  
 
Regression analyses confirmed that Restore and Protect had 
significant effects on Achievement approach, ? = .49, p < .001 and 
? = -.37, p < .01, respectively, and on Achievement avoidance, ? = 
-.26, p < .05 and ? = .68, p < .001, respectively. The effects of 
reported shame on Achievement approach and avoidance were 
fully mediated by Restore and Protect. The effect of shame on 
Achievement approach, ? = .29, p < .05 became nonsignificant 
when Restore and Protect were added to the regression, ? = .07, 
p = .63. The effects of Restore and Protect on Achievement 
approach stayed significant, ? = .49, p < .001 and ? = -.33, p < 
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.05. The effect of shame on Achievement avoidance, ? = .48, p < 
.001 also became nonsignificant when Restore and Protect were 
added to the regression, ? = .06, p = .64. The effects of Restore 
and Protect on Achievement avoidance stayed significant, ? = -
.26, p < .05 and ? = .64, p < .001. 
 
Taken together, Study 4.3 showed that the predictive capacity of 
the restore and protect motives also generalizes to approach and 
avoidance of achievement behaviors. Shame motivates an 
approach of achievement situations and this behavior is positively 
predicted by the restore motive and negatively by the protect 
motive. In Study 4.4 it was examined whether restore and protect 
motives also predict repair and hiding behaviors in unrelated, 
subsequent situations.  
 
 
Study 4.4 
 
Method  
 
Participants. One hundred nine undergraduate students at Tilburg 
University (39 males and 70 females, Mage = 20.17, SD = 1.81) 
participated in a series of unrelated studies and were paid ? 7. 
 
Procedure and variables. All participants read the shame scenario 
of Study 4.1 and rated how much shame, pride, guilt, fear, and 
anger they would feel in the situation (0 = not at all, 10 = very 
strongly). They continued with the ten motivation items measuring 
Restore and Protect (αs > .90). They then read three unrelated 
shame situations and indicated after every situation how much 
they wanted to repair the damage and how much they wanted to 
hide from others in that situation (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly). 
Participants read the following situations: “At high school you 
always told everybody that university is easy. After one year at 
university, you find out that in spite of your dedication and hard 
work you receive only very low grades.”, “During the service at the 
funeral of a family member you remember a joke. You can not 
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withhold yourself and you laugh in such a way that everybody can 
hear it and looks at you.”, and “Together with some fellow students 
you completed a group assignment. Every student is individually 
evaluated on the part (s)he made. In an earlier stage you criticized 
the work of others, but in the end you are the only student of your 
group who failed the exercise.” The dependent variables Repair 
damage and Hiding were measured after each scenario. The 
responses were averaged and labelled Repair damage and 
Hiding.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Participants reported significantly more shame (M = 8.53, SD = 
1.51) than the other emotions, all ts(108) > 9.58, all ps < .001. 
They scored higher on Restore than on Protect, t(107) = 3.40, p < 
.01, and higher on Repair damage (M = 5.86, SD = 0.81) than on 
Hiding (M = 4.64, SD = 1.30), t(107) = 9.50, p < .001. We 
hypothesized that Restore would activate repairing tendencies and 
Protect would activate hiding tendencies. Regression analyses 
showed that Repair damage was significantly predicted by 
Restore, ? = .27, p < .05, and that Hiding was significantly 
predicted by Protect, ? = .26, p < .05. Restore had no influence on 
Hiding, ? = -.04, p = .66, and Protect had no influence on Repair 
damage, ? = .15, p = .14.  
 
To summarize, shame activates more repairing behavior than 
hiding behavior in unrelated situations and these behaviors are 
differently predicted by protect and restore motives. The restore 
motive predicts repair behaviors and the protect motive predicts 
hiding behaviors. Together, Studies 4.1 to 4.4 reveal that shame 
motivates approach behaviors to restore the self. However, we 
also hypothesized that situational factors influence which behavior 
follows shame (approach or avoidance). To test these mediating 
effects Study 4.5 was conducted, where local competency was 
measured as a mediating situational factor.  
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Study 4.5 
 
Method  
 
Participants. Seventy undergraduate students at Tilburg University 
(28 males and 42 females, Mage = 21.42, SD = 2.19) participated 
voluntarily in a series of unrelated studies and were randomly 
assigned to the Shame or Control condition. 
 
Procedure and variables. Participants were asked to: “Together 
with some fellow students you completed a group assignment. 
Every student is individually evaluated on the part (s)he made.” In 
the Shame condition, participants then read: “In an earlier stage 
you criticized the work of others, but in the end you are the only 
student of your group who failed the exercise.” In the Control 
condition, participants read: “In the end every student of your 
group has passed the exercise.” As a manipulation check, 
participants subsequently rated how much shame, pride, guilt, and 
fear they would feel in the described situation (0 = not at all, 10 = 
very strongly). After the emotion induction, participants answered 
the restore and protect scales (αrestore = .94 and αprotect = .89) and 
subsequently read:  
 
After the announcement of the grades, the teacher tells about the 
opportunity to do another exercise. If you decide to do this exercise, you 
will also be evaluated with a grade. You consider whether you want to 
do this. On the one hand, this is your opportunity to perform well. On the 
other hand, it also could go wrong.  
 
As a measure of Competency, participants responded to four 
items derived from Ajzen and Driver (1992) (1 = completely 
disagree, 7 = completely agree, α = .74): “I have confidence that I 
would complete that exercise well”, “I have control over the 
outcome of that exercise”, “I have no influence on the outcome of 
that exercise”, and “I have the abilities to complete that exercise 
successfully”. As the dependent measure of Performance choice, 
participants indicated whether they would make the exercise.  
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Results and Discussion 
 
Participants in the Shame condition reported significantly more 
shame (M = 6.37, SD = 2.68) than participants in the Control 
condition (M = 0.54, SD = 1.35), t(68) = 10.61, p < .001, and 
reported significantly more shame than the other emotions, all 
ts(40) > 3.47, all ps < .01. Participants in the Shame condition 
scored significantly higher on Restore, t(68) = 7.60, p < .001, and 
on Protect than participants in the Control condition, t(68) = 4.81, p 
< .001. Restore was significantly higher than Protect in the Shame 
condition, t(40) = 3.51, p < .01.  
 
Performance. More participants in the Shame condition (90%) 
wanted to engage in a new performance compared to participants 
in the Control condition (62%), ?²(1, N = 70) = 8.01, p < .01. 
Furthermore, Restore and Protect had significant effects on 
Performance choice, Wald(1) = 10.67, p < .01, and Wald(1) = 
8.46, p < .01, respectively. The effect of Emotion condition on 
Performance choice was fully mediated by Restore and Protect: 
the significant effect of Emotion condition, Wald(1) = 7.09, p < .01, 
became nonsignificant when Restore and Protect were added to 
the regression, Wald(1) = 0.31, p = .58.  
 
Competency. Participants in the Shame condition (M = 5.48, SD = 
0.91) and in the Control condition (M = 5.53, SD = 0.91) did not 
differ in Competency, t(68) = 0.27, p = .79. Competency had a 
significant influence on Performance choice, Wald(1) = 3.29, p = 
.07. We hypothesized that the effects of Restore and Protect on 
Performance choice would be mediated by Competency. Indeed, 
the effects of Restore and Protect became nonsignificant when 
Competency was added to the regression, Wald(1) = 2.22, p = .14, 
and Wald(1) = 1.55, p = .21, respectively. The effect of 
Competency remained significant, Wald(1) = 5.91, p < .05. To 
summarize, the effects of restore and protect motives on behavior 
are mediated by a relevant situational factor. Study 4.5 showed 
that local competency mediated the effects of restore and protect 
motivations on performance. 
Restore and protect motivations following shame 
87 
Table 4.1 
Motivation Means (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of Emotion 
Condition in Studies 4.1 to 4.5 
 Shame Control 
Study Restore Protect Restore Protect 
4.1 3.78 (1.89)a 4.16 (1.99)a 2.51 (1.50)b 3.61 (1.81)c 
4.2 5.14 (1.23)a 3.59 (1.52)b 3.48 (1.26)b 2.08 (0.96)c 
4.3 6.26 (1.88)a 6.40 (1.87)a   
4.4 4.75 (1.70)a 3.85 (1.66)b   
4.5 5.34 (0.96)a 4.88 (1.05)b 3.07 (1.55)c 3.37 (1.58)c 
Note. Motivation scores could range from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly). 
Means with a different superscript differ significantly from each other within 
each study with all ts > 2.12, all ps < .05. There was no Control condition in 
Studies 4.3 and 4.4.  
 
 
General Discussion 
 
What do people do when they experience shame? This question is 
difficult to answer on the basis of previous research on shame, 
which suggested both approach and withdrawal behaviors. From 
the present studies it appears that the answer is actually quite 
simple. After a shame experience, people want to cope with their 
threatened self. Because their fundamental motive is to have a 
positive self-image, they initially undertake actions to repair the 
self. When this is not possible or too risky, they revert to withdraw 
strategies to protect themselves from more possible damage.  
 
Five experiments clearly support the notion that shame activates 
both restore and protect motives, which produce approach or 
avoidance behaviors depending on situational factors. Protect and 
restore motives were activated after reading a shame scenario 
(Study 4.1) and after describing an experienced shame event 
(Study 4.2) and predicted the higher willingness to enter new 
performance situations. Moreover, these motivations predicted the 
higher approach and lower avoidance tendencies (Study 4.3) and 
the higher repair and lower hiding tendencies (Study 4.4) after a 
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shame event. Finally, the influences of restore and protect motives 
on approach behaviors were mediated by local competency (Study 
4.5). Thus, shame initially induces approach behaviors to restore 
one’s self view, but, when this is not possible to too risky, it 
induces withdrawal behaviors to protect one’s self view.  
 
These findings constitute an important contribution to the 
understanding of the nature and functions of shame. Empirical 
studies on the behaviors following shame have found mixed 
results, showing that shame can sometimes promote withdrawal 
behavior and sometimes approach behavior. Shame theories have 
not been able to explain these mixed findings because they only 
focus on withdrawal behaviors following shame and remain silent 
about motivations that are activated by shame. By taking a 
pragmatic position (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006), we have 
provided a simple answer to these complex matters. Our 
explanation includes shame theories’ emphasis on withdrawal 
behaviors, but adds motivations and approach behaviors, making 
the picture of shame complete.  
 
One of the implications of our findings is that the general image of 
shame in emotion literature should at least be partly changed. 
Shame is often perceived as an “ugly emotion”, involving a 
preoccupation with oneself and short-circuiting any behaviors 
other than social avoidance (Tangney, 1991). For example, shame 
is frequently equalized to social anxiety, an anxiety arising from 
the prospect or presence of interpersonal evaluations, because 
both are marked by escape behaviors (Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; 
Leary & Kowalski, 1995). The present findings show that this 
rather negative, ugly image of shame is only partially right, and 
that shame mainly activates approach behaviors to restore one’s 
self. Thus, shame can have positive effects and therefore may not 
be as ugly as is sometimes assumed. 
 
Even though our studies show that shame can promote approach 
behaviors that are very similar to those promoted by the emotion 
guilt, we think that there is little reason to doubt the view of shame 
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and guilt as two distinct emotions. However, we do think that our 
data show that they should not be distinguished on basis of the 
behavioral tendencies that they activate. In most of the emotion 
literature, shame and guilt are differentiated on the basis of their 
association with behavior: shame is associated with avoidance 
behaviors and guilt is associated with approach behaviors or 
“outward movement, aimed at reparation for a wrongdoing” 
(Caplovitz Barrett, 1995, p. 26). We found that shame primarily 
activates approach behaviors, cancelling out behavior as a 
criterion for distinguishing both emotions. Even so, the 
psychological origins and motivations of shame and guilt are 
clearly distinct. Guilt arises after an evaluation of the behavior, 
signaling that one has caused harm, loss, or distress to a 
relationship partner (Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006; Tangney et 
al., 1996). Indeed, guilt activates a focus on the hurt other and 
motivates approach behavior to maintain and enhance the dyadic 
relationship (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). In 
contrast, shame arises after a negative evaluation of the self, 
signaling that something is wrong with one’s core self (H. B. Lewis, 
1971). The following approach behavior is undertaken with a focus 
on restoring one’s core self. Both processes can motivate 
approach behavior, but do so for quite different reasons. This also 
means that shame and guilt can have different behavioral effects 
depending upon the extent to which a situation allows for 
fulfillment of the motivations underlying both emotions (see 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 5).  
 
In closing, let us return to the question that was central in our 
research: what do people do when they experience shame? The 
answer seemed a complex one, being answered with “withdrawal 
or approach” by empirical research, and with “withdrawal, but we 
don’t know how” by shame theories. It appears that the answer is 
actually quite simple. Shame stimulates regaining the positive 
image one had lost, but when this is impossible, it reverts to 
avoiding further losses. With this knowledge, we may finally be 
able to predict and understand what people do after making a 
faux-pass. 
Chapter 4 
90 
Appendix 4.1 
 
Items and Factor Loadings of the Motivations Measure 
 
Item Factor 
loading 
Restore 
Factor 
loading 
Protect 
1. improve my self image .85 -.07 
2. show myself I can present .95 -.16 
3. show myself I am good .95 -.12 
4. come better out into the open .85 -.12 
5. ensure myself I am competent .92 -.09 
6. avoid more damage to my self image .01 .91 
7. protect myself -.05 .90 
8. avoid another bad presentation -.22 .85 
9. avoid making a fool of myself again -.22 .89 
10. did not want to get a worse image of 
myself 
-.08 .83 
Note. Items were complements to the sentence “I chose (not) to give the 
presentation because I wanted to…” and could be answered at 7-point scales 
with end points labelled 1 (not at all) and 7 (very strongly). Item 4 consisted of a 
Dutch proverb, in Dutch “beter uit de verf komen”, which could not be translated 
literally into English. 
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Appendix 4.2 
 
Items and Factor Loadings of the Achievement Scale 
 
Item Factor 
loadings 
Achievement 
approach 
Factor 
loadings 
Achievement 
avoidance 
1. Try challenging activities .59 -.32 
2. Learn new things .70 .08 
3. Join in competitive activities .73 -.10 
4. Do my best to show others my 
capacities 
.67 .03 
5. Avoid activities I am not good at .07 .89 
6. Evade situations where my capacities 
are tested 
-.02 .83 
7. Stay clear of situations where you have 
to perform 
.03 .94 
8. Keep clear of competitive situations -.16 .74 
Note. Items were complements to the sentence “After that presentation I 
would…” and could be answered at 11-point scales with end points labelled 0 
(very unlikely) and 10 (very likely). 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
The Dark Side of Guilt: 
 
Acting ‘Prosocially’  
 
At the Expense of Others4 
 
 
Guilt may be among the most important emotions in society, 
playing a role in socialization practices and ensuring survival of 
individuals in groups (Ausubel, 1955; Frank, 1988; Smith, 1759). 
Although guilt is an unpleasant emotion, it has been argued to 
have beneficial consequences for people’s social surroundings. 
Ample empirical research has demonstrated many positive effects 
of guilt for interpersonal relationships and society (e.g., 
Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Freedman, Wallington, 
& Bless, 1967; Ketelaar & Au, 2003). All in all, guilt is portrayed as 
the “good emotion” (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1999; 
Wong & Tsai, 2007). In this article, however, we reveal that there 
is a dark side to guilt as well. Five experiments demonstrate that 
guilt motivates compensatory behaviors towards the people to 
whom we feel guilty, but that this occurs at the expense of others 
in our social environment. We argue that this dark side of guilt is a 
logical consequence of the experience and function associated 
with this emotion. As such, the present studies contribute to a 
more complete understanding of the way that moral emotions 
motivate interpersonal behavior.  
 
The Bright Side of Guilt 
 
Almost fifty years of research has resulted in an image of guilt as 
an “adaptive emotion, benefiting individuals and their relationships 
in a variety of ways” (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007b, p. 26). 
By now, the emotion literature provides a coherent picture of the 
antecedents, experiential content, and consequences of this 
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emotion. The function of guilt is to protect and enhance social 
relationships by punishing interpersonal wrongdoings and 
restoring inequities (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 
1998). Thus, it most often arises from a moral transgression in 
which the actor appraises the situation as having violated an 
important norm and having hurt another person (Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). This appraisal elicits 
feelings of tension and remorse and, important to the present 
study, a preoccupation with the transgression (Lewis, 1987; 
Tangney, 1999). Experiences of guilt motivate reparative actions 
such as confessions, apologies, and attempts to undo the harm 
done (Caplovitz Barrett, 1995; Lewis, 1971, 1987; Lindsay-Hartz, 
1984). In the words of Izard (1977, p. 422, italics added): “the 
experience of guilt binds the person to the source of guilt and does 
not subside without reconciliation that tends to restore social 
harmony”. 
 
Even economists, who usually tend to adhere to a strictly self-
interested view of man, acknowledge that guilt may inhibit selfish 
tendencies to choose for immediate personal gain at the expense 
of others (e.g., Frank, 1988). Instead, guilt spurs prosocial action 
that also benefits one’s social environment, which eventually 
yields an even more profitable long-term strategy. Therefore, guilt 
is often characterized as a moral emotion, one that is linked to the 
welfare of society and that stimulates people to think of how one’s 
own behavior influences the well-being of other people (Haidt, 
2003; Smith, 1759). 
 
There is much empirical evidence for the notion of guilt as a moral 
and adaptive emotion. For example, guilt has been found to 
motivate a heightened sense of personal responsibility, 
compliance, and forgiveness, and to generate more constructive 
strategies to cope with anger (Freedman et al., 1967; Izard, 1977; 
McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Strelan, 2007; Stuewig, 
Tangney, Heigel, & Harty, 2008; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & 
Gramzow, 1992). Several studies have also shown that guilt is 
strongly related to reparative intentions (Schmader & Lickel, 2006; 
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Tangney, 1993). For example, Tangney, Miller, Flicker, and 
Barlow (1996) found that people reported a higher desire to make 
amends after describing a guilt experience than after describing a 
shame or embarrassment experience. When studying the 
phenomenology, action tendencies, and emotivational goals of 10 
different emotions, Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz (1994) found that 
participants who recalled a guilt experience felt like undoing their 
actions, punishing themselves, apologizing, and wanting to make 
up for their transgression and to be forgiven. Importantly, cross-
cultural studies have shown that these characteristics of guilt are 
quite similar across a wide array of cultures (Breugelmans & 
Poortinga, 2006; Fontaine et al., 2006), which is testimony to the 
universal moral character of guilt. 
 
Perhaps the most direct evidence for moral effects of guilt has 
been given by a recent series of studies on the effect of emotions 
on prosocial behavior in dyadic relationships. Ketelaar and Au 
(2003) showed that people acted more prosocially in social 
dilemma games after an autobiographical recall procedure 
inducing feelings of guilt or after making an unfair offer in an 
earlier round of the game. These findings were replicated by 
Nelissen, Dijker, and De Vries (2007), who found that an induction 
of guilt increased prosocial behavior while an induction of fear did 
not. Chapter 2 found similar results, reporting prosocial effects for 
guilt in a social dilemma as well as on a measure of everyday 
cooperation.  
 
To summarize, guilt appears to be a good, moral emotion, having 
a bright side that produces beneficial consequences for people in 
one’s social surrounding. However, we suggest that in its prosocial 
trail, guilt has a dark side on the interpersonal level as well, one 
that is particularly relevant with respect to the current moral and 
prosocial take on guilt. Importantly, we propose that this dark side 
of guilt goes hand in hand with the bright side, that is, it is a direct 
consequence of the focus on repairing the relationship with people 
one feels guilty towards.  
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The Dark Side of Guilt 
 
We are not the first to state that guilt has a dark side. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, guilt was mostly understood 
from an intrapersonal perspective and thought to be the result of a 
conflict between the superego and the id. In Freud’s view, guilt 
feelings would have negative intrapersonal effects such as 
melancholia, obsessional neuroses, and masochism (Freud, 
1917/1957, 1923/1961). Later, the focus of theories and empirical 
research shifted towards an interpersonal view of guilt, resulting in 
a more positive evaluation. In the present article we suggest that 
guilt has a dark side on the interpersonal level as well. 
 
When experiencing guilt, people are focused on what they have 
done wrong and on the person that has been hurt by their actions 
(Lewis, 1971). So, guilt focuses people on the impact of their 
actions on the relationship with a specific other. This means that 
the action tendencies ensuing from guilt are mainly aimed at 
restoring this dyadic relationship. In the words of Baumeister et al. 
(1994): “After doing something bad to another person, people are 
motivated to help that person or comply with that person’s wishes, 
apparently to rectify any inequity and to repair any damage to the 
relationship” (p. 260, italics added). The role of guilt as a moral 
emotion is obvious in dyadic relationships, because any 
compensatory behavior directly benefits the victim (and hence 
improves that specific social relationship). However, in daily life 
people typically interact with multiple people.  
 
When we take a broader perspective on moral behavior, looking 
beyond dyadic relationships, it becomes clear that guilt can also 
have negative interpersonal consequences. More specifically, we 
argue that the dyadic preoccupation that is central to experiences 
of guilt can lead to behavior that is negative for the outcomes of 
third parties. This is because people will generally compensate at 
the expense of the resources allocated to other people rather than 
those allocated to themselves. Guilt motivates a preoccupation 
with the hurt other, implying that less attention will be paid to other 
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social partners. If we think of moral behavior in terms of resources, 
the benefits extended to one individual can only be made at the 
expense of another, be it oneself or other people. In other words, 
guilt may lead to an extra investment in the relationship with the 
victim but someone else will have to pay the bill. This is what we 
call the dark side of guilt.  
 
The hypothesis that guilty people compensate a victim of their 
actions at the expense of other people and not at the expense of 
themselves is based on the analysis of this emotion from an 
equity-perspective. According to Interdependence theory (Kelly & 
Thibaut, 1978) and Social Value Orientation theory (Messick & 
McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), 
people are naturally concerned with their personal outcomes, but 
also with how their outcomes relate to those of other people. 
When experiencing guilt, people momentarily experience elevated 
concern for the outcome of the other person, at the expense of 
their personal outcome. At least, this is what happens in dyadic 
situations. We think that when a third party is present, the usual 
concern for one’s personal outcomes can be maintained along 
with a heightened concern for the outcome to the hurt other that is 
evoked by guilt. According to Walster, Berscheid, and Walster 
(1970), in such instances “the harm doer is not only motivated by a 
desire for equity restoration, but also will act in such a way as to 
achieve the highest possible profit and satisfaction from his 
relationship with the victim” (p. 190). In terms of outcomes, the 
only way in which one can restore relationships in dyadic 
situations is by acting prosocially at the expense of oneself. 
However, at the level of multiple relationships, one can restore the 
hurt relationship and still gain the highest possible profit by acting 
‘prosocially’ at the expense of other people around and not at the 
expense of oneself. This notion is best summarized by Freedman 
(1970), according to whom people who experience guilt “just do 
not like to suffer if they can possibly avoid it” (p. 159). This does 
not mean that people intentionally harm a third party, but rather 
that their focus on the dyadic relationship may simply lead them to 
fail to notice the consequences of their behavior for others. 
Chapter 5  
98 
There are at least two reasons why researchers may have 
overlooked the dark side of guilt. First, studies that do specify an 
object have typically investigated effects of guilt in dyadic 
situations and not in three- or multiple-person situations (Chapter 
2; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen et al., 2007). Second, most 
research showing positive effects of guilt have measured behavior 
or intentions in general terms without specifying an object, for 
example with rating scales such as “I wanted to make amends” or 
“I wanted to be forgiven” (Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 
1996). Such studies find positive effects for guilt because behavior 
towards the hurt other is captured in general measures without an 
object. However, without specifying objects it is not possible to 
show that the positive effects only apply to the relationship with the 
hurt person and may damage relationships with third parties. 
Thus, we can conclude that studies of guilt so far have not yet 
addressed the possibility that guilt may hurt relationships other 
than the guilt-focused relationship.  
 
To recapitulate, the bright side of guilt (i.e., the focus on restoring 
the relationship with the hurt other) brings along the dark side such 
that the benefits for the hurt other will occur not at the expense of 
oneself, but at the expense of others. This dark side has, to our 
best knowledge, never been empirically investigated, because 
studies so far have focused on general measures of intentions or 
on dyadic relationships. It follows that for a complete 
understanding of the interpersonal consequences of guilt, it is 
necessary to study the effects of guilt in multiple-person situations. 
In the present article, five studies are presented that address the 
interpersonal consequences of guilt in such multiple-person 
situations, using different types of guilt inductions and different 
measures for prosocial behavior. The data clearly reveals the dark 
side of this otherwise good emotion. 
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Experiment 5.1 
 
The central purpose of Experiment 5.1 was to replicate the finding 
that guilt motivates prosocial behavior in dyadic situations. This 
finding has been shown in previous research, but by means of 
slightly different research methods than those used in our 
experiments (Chapter 2; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen et al., 
2007). A replication of the dyadic effects of guilt in Experiment 5.1 
provides us with a baseline with which to compare the results of 
Experiments 5.2 to 5.5 that study guilt in multiple-person 
interactions.  
 
Method  
 
Participants and design. Sixty-two undergraduate students from 
Tilburg University (10 males and 52 females, Mage = 20.11, SD = 
4.32) participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the Guilt or Control 
condition.  
 
Procedure and variables. Participants were asked to: “Imagine that 
you follow a course in which you have to take an exam and write a 
paper. You have already passed the exam. You write the paper 
together with a fellow student, Robert.” In the Guilt condition, 
participants then read:  
 
Because you already passed your exam and because you do not feel 
like writing the paper, you hardly put any effort into it and Robert does 
almost all the work. After handing in the paper it turns out that you both 
failed because your own part was insufficient. Due to this low mark 
Robert does not pass the course and has to retake the subject next 
year.  
 
In the Control condition, participants read: “After handing in the 
paper it turns out that you both passed because both your parts 
were sufficient”. As a manipulation check, participants 
subsequently indicated on 11-point scales (0 = not at all, 10 = very 
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strongly) how much guilt, pride, shame, regret, and fear they 
would feel in the described situation. After the scenario and the 
emotion manipulation check, participants read:  
 
A day after the event you participate together with Robert in a study. The 
researcher gives you 50 euros and explains that you can decide what 
you want to do with this money. You can keep everything, or you can 
offer (a part) to Robert.  
 
As dependent variable for prosocial behavior, a dictator game was 
used in which participants indicated how they would divide the 50 
euros (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). After completion of 
all tasks, participants were thanked and debriefed.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Emotion Manipulation Check. The manipulation checks showed 
that the manipulation of the emotion guilt was successful. 
Participants in the Guilt condition (M = 9.09, SD = 1.06) reported 
significantly more guilt than participants in the Control condition (M 
= 0.48, SD = 1.06), t(60) = 32.25, p < .001, and significantly more 
guilt than other emotions, all ts(31) > 3.37, ps < .01. There were 
no differences between conditions on the other assessed 
emotions. 
 
Monetary divisions. Results for the monetary division are 
displayed in Table 5.1. We hypothesized that guilt would motivate 
higher offers to the hurt other and that this would (inevitably) be at 
the expense of oneself in two-person situations. We found that 
participants in the Guilt condition offered more money to Robert 
(and by definition, less money to themselves) than participants in 
the Control condition, t(60) = 3.95, p < .001. So, Experiment 5.1 
replicated previous findings with a different method showing that 
guilt motivates prosocial behavior at the expense of oneself in two-
person situations. Experiment 5.2 was conducted to test whether 
this finding still holds when there are multiple persons present.  
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Experiment 5.2 
 
Method 
 
Participants and procedure. Fifty-two people from the 
surroundings of Tilburg (14 males and 38 females, Mage = 23.73, 
SD = 8.39) participated voluntarily in this experiment. They were 
randomly assigned to the Guilt or Control condition and were 
presented with the following scenario:  
 
Imagine you are in a hurry because you want to get a special offer at a 
shop just before closing time. You do not have a means of transportation 
but you know that your friend Hans has a bicycle. This bicycle is very 
special to him because it is the last present given to him by his 
grandmother before she died. Nevertheless, he lets you use the bicycle. 
You cycle to the shop and get the special offer. 
 
In the Guilt condition, participants read: “When you leave the shop 
you find out that the bicycle is stolen; you forgot to lock it. You 
inform Hans about this and he is very sad.” In the Control 
condition, participants read: “When you leave the shop you take 
the bicycle and bring it back to Hans.” As an emotion manipulation 
check, participants subsequently indicated (0 = not at all, 10 = very 
strongly) how much guilt, pride, shame, regret, and fear they 
would feel in the described situation.  
 
Next, they read: “A week after the event are the birthdays of your 
friend Hans and of another friend, Jan. You have 50 euros that 
you can spend.” As dependent measures, participants indicated 
how they would spend the 50 euros between Hans and Jan, and 
how much money they would keep for themselves.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Emotion Manipulation Check. The manipulation checks showed 
that the manipulation of guilt was successful. Participants in the 
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Guilt condition (M = 9.16, SD = 1.37) reported significantly more 
guilt than those in the Control condition (M = 4.35, SD = 3.22), 
t(50) = 7.47, p < .001, and significantly more guilt than other 
emotions, all ts(31) > 3.52, ps < .001. There were no differences 
between conditions on the other assessed emotions. 
 
Monetary division. Results for the monetary division are displayed 
in Table 5.1. We hypothesized that guilt would motivate higher 
offers to the hurt other at the expense of third parties and not at 
the expense of oneself. The results supported our hypotheses: 
participants in the Guilt condition offered more money to Hans 
than participants in the Control condition, t(50) = 3.43, p < .01. 
This higher offer was at the expense of the third person Jan and 
not at the expense of oneself: participants in the Guilt condition 
offered less money to Jan than participants in the Control 
condition, t(50) = 3.25, p < .01. Participants in the Guilt condition 
did not differ from participants in the Control condition in the 
amount of money kept to themselves, t(50) = 1.60, ns.  
 
To summarize, the view that guilt induces general prosocial 
behavior is challenged in a three-person situation. The data of 
Experiment 5.2 revealed that guilt does motivate prosocial 
behavior towards the person hurt by the guilt event, but that this is 
at the expense of third parties and not at the expense of oneself. 
Experiment 5.3 tested whether this effect would still hold even 
when people were explicitly confronted with a choice between 
unequal outcomes and equal outcomes for the two interaction 
partners (i.e., the hurt other and the third person). If in the face of 
such an explicit choice, people would prefer the unequal division 
of outcomes, this would provide particularly strong support for out 
hypotheses. Because the contrast between the unequal division 
and the equal division is stated very explicitly, we expected that 
guilt would sway preferences towards the unequal divisions, but 
that most people would nevertheless choose the equal division.   
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Experiment 5.3 
 
Method 
 
Participants and procedure. Forty-eight undergraduate students 
(12 males and 36 females, Mage = 19.77, SD = 2.72) participated in 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement and were randomly 
assigned to the Guilt or Control condition. Participants read the 
same scenario as in Experiment 5.2 and subsequently answered 
the emotion questions. Participants then read:  
 
A day after the event you participate in a lab-study together with that 
same friend Hans and another friend, Andre. In this study, the three of 
you will make choices between options A, B, and C. Your choices yield 
points for yourself and for Hans and Andre. The choices of Hans and 
Andre yield points for themselves and for you. Imagine that every point 
is valuable: the more you get, the better. You now read nine situations in 
which you have to choose between three options.  
 
These questions comprised an adjusted version of the Dominance 
Measure of Social Value Orientations (SVO measure, Van Lange 
et al., 1997). In the SVO measure, participants answer nine items 
that consist of different point divisions between the participant and 
an unknown other. The original measure encompasses both 
prosocial (equality) and proself (maximizing and individualistic) 
choices. In our adjusted version, the nine items consisted of point 
divisions between three instead of two people: the participant, 
Hans, and Andre. The divisions encompassed an equality choice 
(all three persons receive an equal amount of points), an 
individualistic choice (the participant receives more than both 
Hans and Andre) and a compensation choice (Hans receives more 
and Andre less, with the participant slightly less than Hans). For 
example, Choice A: 480 for you, 480 for Hans and 480 for Andre 
(the equality option); Choice B: 540 for you, 280 for Hans, 280 for 
Andre (the individualistic option); Choice C: 480 for you, 540 for 
Hans, 280 for Andre (the compensation option). 
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Because participants can choose only one option in every 
situation, compensation will be at the expense of oneself (that is, 
participants will choose the compensation option more often and 
the individualistic option less often) or at the expense of the third 
party (that is, participants will choose the compensation option 
more often and the equality option less often). In line with our 
reasoning and with the results of the previous study, we expected 
in the Guilt condition increased frequencies of choice for the 
compensation option to be made at the expense of the equality 
option (hurting the other) rather than at the expense of the 
individualistic option. The number of equality options, 
individualistic options, and compensation options chosen formed 
the dependent variables.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Emotion Manipulation Check. The manipulation of guilt was 
successful: Participants in the Guilt condition (M = 9.33, SD = 
0.96) reported significantly more guilt than participants in the 
Control condition (M = 2.63, SD = 2.68), t(46) = 11.53, p < .001, 
and significantly more guilt than other emotions (all ts(23) > 2.23, 
ps < .05). There were no differences between emotion conditions 
on the other assessed emotions. 
 
Point division. Results for the point division are displayed in Table 
5.2. We first computed a difference score: the number of times the 
compensation option was chosen minus the number of times the 
equality option was chosen. The results showed that participants 
in the Guilt condition scored higher than participants in the Control 
condition, t(46) = 2.25, p < .05. Participants in the Guilt condition 
chose more often for compensation compared to participants in 
the Control condition, at the expense of equality.  
 
Following the procedures of the SVO measure, participants could 
be classified as compensators, equalizers, and individualists when 
they had chosen one option for six or more times. There were 
more compensators (32 %) and less equalizers (59 %) in the Guilt 
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condition than in the Control condition (4 % and 82 %, 
respectively), but there was no difference in the number of 
individualists (9 % for Guilt condition and 14 % for Control 
condition), ?²(2, N = 48) = 5.51, p = .06.  
 
Taken together, when the choice between equal and unequal 
outcomes is explicitly stated, people mostly opt for an equal 
division of outcomes. Still, guilt more strongly motivates a 
preference for situations in which the hurt other receives more and 
a third person receives less and decreases a preference for 
equality situations. This finding is in line with our hypothesis and 
with the findings of Experiment 5.2 that guilt motivates prosocial 
behavior towards the hurt person at the expense of third parties 
and not at the expense of oneself.  
 
One could imagine that it is one thing to act prosocially at the 
expense of others when those others can afford to receive less. 
However, acting prosocially at the expense of others who need 
everything they can get, such as charities, is something else. To 
test how far the dark effects of guilt will go, we conducted 
Experiment 5.4. In this experiment, guilt was induced with an 
autobiographical recall manipulation and a charity was used as the 
third party.  
 
Table 5.2  
Chosen Division Means (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of Emotion 
Condition in Experiment 5.3 
 
Emotion condition 
 
Chosen Division Guilt 
M (SD)  
Control 
M (SD) 
Compensation 2.79 (3.83) > 0.71 (2.12) 
Equality 5.29 (4.03) < 7.25 (3.12) 
Individualism 0.92 (2.62) = 1.04 (2.46) 
Note. Division scores could range from 0 to 9 chosen situations. There are no 
significant differences between means separated by an “=” mark. Means 
separated by an“>”or“<”mark are significantly different with t(46) = 2.25, p < .05. 
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Experiment 5.4 
 
Method 
 
Thirty-three inhabitants of Tilburg (11 males and 22 females, Mage 
= 23.70, SD = 5.19) participated voluntary in this study and were 
randomly assigned to the Guilt or Control condition. Participants in 
the Guilt condition were asked to report a personal experience in 
which they felt very guilty (cf., Chapter 2, Ketelaar and Au, 2003). 
For example, they wrote about cheating their partner, forgetting a 
friend’s birthday or breaking valuable things of others. In the 
Control condition, participants were asked to describe a regular 
weekday. Participants worked approximately 10 minutes on the 
emotion induction task. 
 
Subsequently, participants were asked to think of the person they 
hurt or offended in the described guilt experience or of a person 
they had met in the described weekday. This person was labeled 
Person A. Participants then read: “A week after the described 
experience is the birthday of Person A and a big collection for the 
victims of a flood in Africa. You have 50 euros you can spend.” 
and subsequently indicated how they would divide the 50 euros. 
After the monetary division, participants were asked to reread their 
situation description and to indicate how much guilt they felt in the 
situation or in the normal weekday. They also indicated (0 = not at 
all, 10 = very strongly) how much shame, regret, disappointment, 
sadness, fear, anger at self, anger at others, and dissatisfaction 
they felt in the situation.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Emotion Manipulation Check. The manipulation of guilt was 
successful: participants in the Guilt condition (M = 8.13, SD = 
1.59) reported significantly more guilt than participants in the 
Control condition (M = 1.65, SD = 2.29), t(31) = 9.39, p < .001 and 
significantly more guilt than other emotions (all ts(15) > 2.12, ps < 
.05). There were no differences between emotion conditions on 
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the other assessed emotions. 
 
Monetary division. Results for the monetary division are displayed 
in Table 5.1. We expected and found that participants in the Guilt 
condition offered more money to Person A than participants in the 
Control condition, t(31) = 2.20, p < .05. This higher offer was at the 
expense of the charity and not at the expense of oneself. 
Participants in the Guilt condition offered less money to charity 
than participants in the Control condition, t(31) = 2.00, p = .05. 
Participants in the Guilt condition did not differ in the amount of 
money kept for themselves from participants in the Control 
condition, t(31) = 0.47, ns.  
 
These results extend the findings of Experiments 5.2 and 5.3: Guilt 
not only motivates prosocial behavior at the expense of another 
person, but also at the expense of good causes for those who are 
in need for financial help. The experiments so far have clearly 
shown that the dark side of guilt can be demonstrated by means of 
standard and well-accepted emotion induction procedures. 
However, the credibility of the findings would be much increased if 
guilt was experimentally induced and actually experienced, rather 
than recalled or imagined. Therefore, Experiment 5.5 was 
conducted.  
 
 
Experiment 5.5 
 
In Experiment 5.5 we aimed to reveal that the dark effects of guilt 
are a result of a preoccupation with the hurt other. According to 
our proposition, people act prosocially at the expense of third 
others because they are intensely focused on the hurt other, and 
then neglect the well-being of third parties. This would thus occur 
only in situations where the hurt other is present. In situations 
where the hurt other is not present, we would only expect the 
generic spill-over effects of guilt also found in previous research, 
motivating prosocial behaviors towards all others present (Chapter 
2; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen et al., 2007). This was explicitly 
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tested in Experiment 5.5, where participants interacted with the 
hurt other and a third party, or with two unrelated persons.  
 
An additional benefit of this design was that we could control for a 
potential alternative explanation of the findings, namely order 
effects. In the previous studies, participants first indicated the 
money given to the hurt other, then the money given to the third 
party and lastly indicated the amount of money they would keep. It 
is possible that we found dark effects of guilt simply because 
participants distract the money from the second source, which is 
the third party. If this would be the case, we would find the same 
results in the condition where the hurt other is not present.  
 
Method 
 
Participants and design. One hundred forty-three students at 
Tilburg University (23 males and 120 females, Mage = 20.12, SD = 
4.14) participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. 
They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Emotion 
condition: Guilt vs. Control) × 2 (Presence hurt other: Present vs. 
Not-present) between-subjects design with Lottery ticket division 
as dependent variable.  
 
Procedure and variables. Participants entered the laboratory in 
groups of nine to twelve participants. They were seated in 
separate cubicles and informed that they would be connected to 
other participants with their computer throughout the hour. They 
were explained that they could earn lottery tickets in different 
tasks. At the end of the hour, the lottery would take place and one 
of the participants would win 10 euros.  
 
The session started with a reaction task. Participants were told 
that they played two rounds of a so-called letter task, ostensibly 
with another participant (adopted from Reitsma-Van Rooijen, 
Semin, & Van Leeuwen, 2008). In the task, letters would rapidly 
appear on the screen in a red or green color. To earn points, the 
participant had to react on green letters before they disappeared 
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by pressing the corresponding letter on the keyboard. If the 
appearing letter was red, the other player had to react on time to 
earn one point. After three minutes, their total scores would be 
calculated and feedback would be given. Participants were 
explained that they would play two rounds. In the first round they 
could earn a bonus of 8 lottery tickets for themselves, in the 
second round they could earn a bonus of 8 lottery tickets for the 
other player. Importantly, both players needed to do well in order 
to reach the minimum level of 100 points to get the bonus.  
 
After playing the first round of the letter task, all participants 
received bogus feedback that they earned the bonus due to well 
performance of both the participant and the other player. 
Participants subsequently played the second round of the letter 
task and received bogus feedback about other player’s bonus. In 
the Guilt condition, the other player did not receive the bonus due 
to the participant’s bad performance. In the Control condition, the 
other player received the bonus due to good performance of both 
the participant and the other player.  
 
Following this, participants continued with a three person-dictator 
game with the player from the letter task (Present condition) or 
with a participant who knew nothing about the letter task (Not-
present condition). Because this person differed between Not-
present and Present conditions, we labeled this person Person A. 
In all conditions the third player was a participant who knew 
nothing about the letter task. It was explained that one of them 
would be given either nine or twelve lottery tickets, which that 
person could divide among the three players as he or she wished. 
The participant was ostensibly selected at random to divide the 
tickets and was given twelve tickets to divide, but was told that the 
other two participants did not know whether there were nine or 
twelve tickets to divide (adopted from Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). 
The lack of knowledge of the two other participants about the 
exact amount of tickets to divide offered the participant the 
opportunity to unequally divide the tickets without consequences. 
The number of tickets offered to Person A, to the third player and 
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the number of tickets kept for oneself formed our dependent 
measures.  
 
As a manipulation check participants subsequently indicated (0 = 
not at all, 10 = very strongly) how responsible they felt, how much 
they felt that what they had done was wrong, how much they 
thought about what they had done to the other person, how much 
they wanted to repair what had happened, and how much they 
wanted to be forgiven. These are described in the emotion 
literature as basic elements of guilt (Caplovitz Barrett, 1995; 
Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 
1996). In addition, participants answered the emotion questions of 
Experiment 5.4. After completion participants were thanked and 
thoroughly debriefed.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Emotion Manipulation Check. The guilt manipulation was 
successful: participants in the Guilt condition scored significantly 
higher on all guilt elements than participants in the Control 
conditions (all ts(141) > 7.13, ps < .001) with the exception of felt 
responsibility, t(141) = 0.37, ns. Participants in the Guilt condition 
also reported significantly more guilt (M = 7.46, SD = 1.99) than 
participants in the Control condition (M = 0.23, SD = 0.76), t(141) 
= 28.92, p < .001 and significantly more guilt than other emotions 
(all ts(69) > 3.94, ps < .001). There were no differences between 
emotion conditions on the other assessed emotions. 
 
Ticket division. Results for the ticket division are displayed in 
Table 5.3. We hypothesized that guilt would motivate higher offers 
to the hurt other at the expense of third parties. We expected and 
found that participants in the Present Guilt condition offered more 
tickets to Person A and fewer tickets to the third player than in the 
Present Control and in the Not-present Guilt condition. A 2 
(Emotion condition) × 2 (Presence hurt other) ANOVA with tickets 
offered to Person A as dependent variable showed significant 
main effects of Emotion condition, F(1, 139) = 15.49, p < .001, ?p2 
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= .10, and of Presence hurt other, F(1, 139) = 11.94, p < .001, ?p2 
= .08. More importantly, there was a significant two-way 
interaction, F(1, 139) = 3.72, p = .05, ?p2 = .03. Participants in the 
Present Guilt condition offered significantly more to Person A than 
participants in the Present Control condition, t(139) = 4.12, p < 
.001, and than participants in the Not-present Guilt condition, 
t(139) = 3.77, p < .001. There was no difference between the Not-
present Guilt condition and Not-present Control condition, t(139) = 
1.42, ns.  
 
The higher amount for Person A was at the expense of the third 
player. A 2 (Emotion condition) × 2 (Presence hurt other) ANOVA 
with tickets offered to the third player as dependent variable 
showed no significant main effects, but a significant two-way 
interaction, F(1, 139) = 9.19, p < .01, ?p2 = .06. Participants in the 
Present Guilt condition offered significantly less to the third player 
 
Table 5.3  
Ticket Division Means (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of Emotion 
condition and Presence of the hurt other in Experiment 5.5 
 
Emotion condition 
 
Presence hurt other 
Division 
Guilt 
M (SD)  
Control 
M (SD) 
Present    
Person A 4.85 (1.89) > 3.63 (1.13) 
Third party 2.82 (1.33) < 3.50 (1.27) 
Self 4.33 (2.06) = 4.87 (2.34) 
Not-present    
Person A 3.73 (0.77) = 3.31 (0.96) 
Third party 3.73 (0.77) = 3.29 (0.99) 
Self 4.54 (1.54) = / < 5.40 (1.93) 
Note. Ticket scores could range from 0 to 12 tickets. There are no significant 
differences between means separated by an “=” mark with all ts < 1.51, ps > 
.14. Means separated by an “= / <” mark are marginally significant different with 
t = 1.83, p = .07, and means separated by an “>” or “<” mark are significantly 
different with both ts > 2.21, ps < .05. 
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than participants in the Present Control condition, t(139) = 2.59, p 
< .05, and than participants in the Not-present Guilt condition, 
t(139) = 3.43, p < .01. There was no difference between the Not-
present Guilt condition and Not-present Control condition, t(139) = 
1.70, ns. 
 
The higher amount for Person A was not at the expense of 
oneself. A 2 (Emotion condition) × 2 (Presence hurt other) ANOVA 
with tickets kept for oneself as dependent variable showed no 
significant main effects and no significant two-way interaction, F(1, 
139) = 0.23, ns. Participants in the Present Guilt condition kept the 
same number of tickets as participants in the Present Control 
condition, t(139) = 1.13, ns, and as participants in the Not-present 
Guilt condition, t(139) = 0.44, ns. Convergent with previous 
research (Chapter 2; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen et al., 2007), 
there was a (marginally significant) difference between the Not-
present Guilt condition and Not-present Control condition, t(139) = 
1.83, p = .07, such that when the hurt other was not present, the 
experience of guilt promoted general prosocial behavior. 
 
Taken together, the results of Experiments 5.2 to 5.4 were 
replicated in Experiment 5.5 by means of an emotion induction in 
the lab. Data revealed that guilt motivates prosocial behavior 
towards the hurt person at the expense of others but not at the 
expense of oneself. The absence of neglect of the well-being of 
others when the hurt other is not present supports the hypothesis 
that the dark effects are the result of a preoccupation with 
repairing the hurt caused, and do not follow from an order effect in 
assigning payoffs. In addition, when the hurt other is not present, 
people keep less money for themselves, showing a generic spill-
over effect of prosocial behavior, corresponding with previous 
research (Chapter 2; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen et al., 2007). 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
Are consequences of guilt roses all the way, or does guilt have a 
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dark side as well? We believe that our studies clearly show that it 
does. Guilt has a bright side in the sense that it benefits the 
person who was hurt by the guilt-inducing event. However, it is 
precisely this bright side that can also give rise to a dark side of 
guilt. When experiencing guilt, people are preoccupied with 
repairing the hurt that they caused in such a way that they may 
overlook the well-being and outcomes of third parties. This can 
result in repairing one relationship at the expense of another. 
 
Five experiments support the notion that guilt has a dark side. 
Using different inductions and different dependent measures, we 
repeatedly found that guilt repairs the hurt relationship at the 
expense of others and not at the expense of oneself. We first 
established that people offered more money to the hurt other at 
the expense of oneself in dyadic situations (Experiment 5.1). 
When extending this situation to a three-person interaction, people 
offered more money to the hurt other at the expense of third 
parties present and not at the expense of oneself (Experiment 
5.2). In addition, they tended to prefer situations where the hurt 
other receives more and a third other receives less over situations 
with equal divisions even if the two were explicitly contrasted 
(Experiment 5.3). People also offered more money to the hurt 
other and less money to a third person if the latter actually needed 
the money (i.e., charity; Experiment 5.4). Finally, Experiment 5.5 
showed that, after experiencing guilt in the lab, participants 
neglected the well-being of third persons only in situations where it 
was possible to repair the damage. Thus, it seems safe to 
conclude that there is ample evidence in favor of the view that guilt 
does have a dark side as well.  
 
We think that the dark side of guilt is not limited to our studies, but 
that it can be regularly found in daily life as well. We found dark 
effects of guilt in situations where a limited set of resources had to 
be divided among various persons. In daily life, people regularly 
encounter situations where decisions have to be made about the 
division of limited resources, such as time, energy, attention, or 
money. If people experience guilt in such situations, they will be 
Dark Side of Guilt 
115 
likely to act prosocially towards the hurt other at the expense of 
third persons. For example, after having forgotten your 
grandmother’s birthday, you may want to make up for this by 
paying her a visit the next day even though had you already made 
an appointment for that time with a friend. The present studies 
also suggest the boundary conditions for the dark side of guilt to 
emerge. Only when resources are limited in a situation of multiple 
interdependencies and the hurt other is present in an interaction 
may guilt have detrimental effects for third parties. When 
interacting in dyadic situations (Experiment 5.1; Chapter 2) or 
when the hurt other is not present (bottom half of Table 5.3; 
Experiment 5.5), guilt can be expected to display only its bright, 
prosocial side.  
 
It is important to stress that our notion of the dark side of guilt is 
consistent with common models and theories of this emotion, 
including the notion of guilt as a moral emotion. Guilt theories 
generally state that guilt arises after a moral transgression in 
which the actor has hurt another person (e.g., Baumeister et al., 
1994; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). This leads to the experience of a 
preoccupation with the transgression and a motivation to 
undertake reparative actions (Caplovitz Barrett, 1995; Lewis, 
1971). We indeed found in each and every experiment that guilt 
motivated prosocial behavior towards the hurt other. However, we 
add to these guilt theories that it is exactly the preoccupation with 
the hurt other that may also cause people to take decisions that 
are not so positive for third others in their social environment. All in 
all, we believe that the extension of the effects of guilt to multiple-
person interactions broadens our view on the way that moral 
emotions can affect social behavior.  
 
There are at least two features of our studies that have a 
relevance that goes beyond the specific emotion of guilt. The first 
is the study of the behavioral effects of emotions beyond dyadic 
situations. Most, if not all, research concerning the behavioral 
effects of specific emotions makes use of situations in which the 
person is alone or together with one other person (e.g., Lerner & 
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Keltner, 2001; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). This 
research has provided a rich and detailed picture of how emotions 
function, but it may not capture the full picture. We showed that 
guilt emerges as a prosocial emotion in dyadic situations, but that 
it does not emerge as unequivocally positive in three-person 
situations. Similarly, it is possible that the behavioral effects of 
other emotions may differ between dyadic and multiple-person 
situations.  
 
The second feature is our understanding of emotion relevance in 
studying the behavioral effects of emotions. Experiment 5.5 
showed that the dark effects of guilt only occur when the hurt other 
is present. Earlier research has made a distinction between 
emotion influences that are related or unrelated to the goal-striving 
process of the emotion (Chapter 3; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). 
Some emotion influences, so-called endogenous influences, are 
relevant for goal pursuit and occur when they concern behaviors in 
situations that are related to the emotion-causing event. Other 
emotion influences, so-called exogenous influences, are irrelevant 
for goal pursuit and occur in situations that are unrelated to the 
emotion-causing event. Such a distinction between exogenous 
and endogenous influences can give different insights in the 
understanding of an emotion. Endogenous influences, being 
relevant for the goal process of the emotion, show something 
about the function and process of an emotion, while exogenous 
influences show carry-over effects of emotions that are unrelated 
to the goal of the emotion. Most scholars are unaware of this 
distinction when studying emotion effects empirically, and almost 
no studies have simultaneously examined endogenous and 
exogenous influences of an emotion (with the exception of 
Chapter 3). It thus appears that, for a complete understanding of 
emotions, one should take into account the distinction and 
consequences of exogenous and endogenous influences of 
emotions.  
 
Having demonstrated the dark side of guilt, how should we now 
evaluate its status as a moral emotion? In our view, the findings 
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that guilt is not always positive for people in one’s social 
environment do not imply that we should abandon the view of guilt 
as a moral emotion. On the contrary, our studies reinforce the view 
of guilt as a commitment device that inhibits selfish tendencies in 
favor of behaviors that benefit people who have been wronged by 
one’s actions (Frank, 1988). However, we do show that moral 
emotions should not be seen as processes that indiscriminately 
generate positive outcomes, but rather that a thorough 
understanding of the experiential and motivational features of 
these emotions is necessary in order to fully appreciate how they 
function in interpersonal relationships. Thus, it should not come as 
a surprise that even the most exemplary of moral emotions comes 
with a dark side.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
Emotions play an important role in our daily lives. They can 
influence for example whether we will take risks, whether we will 
buy those expensive jeans, or whether we will act harshly towards 
another person. But what do people do when they experience 
shame or guilt? Different theories offered diverse predictions, 
ranging from prosocial behavior to reparative and withdrawal 
behaviors, and there was hardly any empirical research on 
behavioral effects of shame and guilt (e.g., Baumeister et al., 
1994; Frank, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Tangney, 
1999). The present dissertation aims to fill this gap. Four chapters 
presented studies on motivations and behaviors following from 
shame and guilt, in order to develop a better understanding of 
these two emotions and of (moral) emotions in general. What did 
these chapters show? 
 
 
Summary of the Empirical Findings 
 
Chapter 2 set out to get more knowledge about exogenous 
influences of shame and guilt on prosocial behavior. It often 
happens that after experiences of shame or guilt, one finds oneself 
in situations that are unrelated to the shame or guilt experience. 
Do shame and guilt then motivate you to act prosocially? On the 
basis of previous findings, it was predicted that guilt would 
motivate prosocial behavior for proselfs towards people unrelated 
to the guilt experience (Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen et al., 
2007). In contrast, on the basis of the assumption that shame 
motivates behavior to deal with a threatened self, it was predicted 
that shame would have no influence on prosocial behavior. 
Consistent with these predictions, two experiments showed that 
guilt motivated prosocial behavior for proselfs, but that shame did 
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not influence prosocial behavior. In Experiment 2.1, proselfs acted 
more prosocially towards an unknown other in a one-shot dilemma 
game after remembering a guilt experience, but not after 
remembering a shame experience or a normal weekday. 
Experiment 2.2 replicated these results, showing that, compared 
to shame and to a control condition, guilt motivated proselfs to 
score higher on helping tendencies in everyday situations. These 
findings seem to suggest that, although shame is a moral emotion, 
it does not motivate prosocial behavior like the moral emotion guilt. 
Does this mean that shame is not a moral emotion and can better 
be seen as a bad emotion? This question was addressed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 3 focused on exogenous and endogenous influences of 
shame on prosocial behavior in order to study whether people do 
act prosocially in situations related to the shame experience. 
Based on the assumption that shame motivates behavior to deal 
with a threatened self, and on the assumption that people can deal 
in different ways with a threatened self, it was hypothesized that 
shame would motivate prosocial behavior for proselfs in situations 
that are related to the shame experience (i.e., endogenously) but 
not in situations that are unrelated to the shame experience (i.e., 
exogenously). In accordance with the hypotheses and with the 
findings of Chapter 2, four experiments showed that endogenous 
shame motivates prosocial behavior for proselfs, while exogenous 
shame has no influence on prosocial behavior. In Experiment 3.1, 
proselfs imagining shame acted more prosocially towards a 
person who had seen the imagined shame experience than 
towards a person who had not seen the imagined shame 
experience, and more prosocially than participants who did not 
imagine shame. Experiment 3.2 replicated these findings when 
participants remembered a shame experience. In addition, 
Experiment 3.3 showed that after a shame experience in the lab, 
proselfs acted more prosocially towards a person who knew about 
the shame event than towards a person who knew nothing about 
the shame event, and more compared to participants did not have 
a shame experience. Finally, Experiment 3.4 showed that this 
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effect could be generalized beyond social dilemmas to helping 
tendencies in everyday situations. In other words, Chapter 3 
showed that shame does motivate prosocial behavior in situations 
or towards people who are related to the shame experience, but 
not in situations or towards people who are unrelated to the shame 
experience. These findings imply that shame can motivate both 
withdrawal behaviors and approach behaviors. How can shame 
motivate such contrasting behaviors? The purpose of Chapter 4 
was to answer this question. 
 
In Chapter 4 the attention was laid upon the motives and approach 
and avoidance behaviors following from shame. One of the 
fundamental human motives is to have a positive self view, but 
when a person experiences shame, this self view is threatened. As 
a consequence, it was hypothesized that shame first and foremost 
motivates approach behaviors in order to restore this threatened 
self view, and when this is not possible or too risky, that shame 
would motivate withdrawal or avoidance behaviors to protect the 
threatened self from more possible harm. Five studies indeed 
showed that shame activates mostly approach behaviors, and that 
the behaviors following from shame are predicted by a restore and 
a protect motive. Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 showed that 
participants had a higher restore and protect motive and were 
more willing to engage in a new performance after a shame 
experience compared to participants who did not have a shame 
experience. Experiments 4.3 and 4.4 showed that these 
heightened restore and protect motives also predicted approach 
and avoidance of achievements, and repair and hiding tendencies. 
Finally, Experiment 4.5 showed that the influences of protect and 
restore motives on behavior can be mediated by situational factors 
such as local competency. Together with the findings of Chapters 
2 and 3, these results clearly show that shame does motivate 
prosocial and approach behaviors, and that this is because shame 
has a restore and a protect motive. 
 
In Chapter 5, the focus shifted back to guilt. Now that we knew 
that the moral emotions shame and guilt motivate prosocial 
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behavior, the following question was: how far does this effect 
reach? Do moral emotions motivate prosocial behavior towards 
everybody? Guilt theories state that guilt motivates a 
preoccupation with the hurt other, stimulating reparative behavior 
aimed at the hurt person (Baumeister et al., 1994; H. B. Lewis, 
1987). This led to the hypothesis that in multiple-person situations 
with the hurt person present, guilt would motivate prosocial 
behavior towards the hurt other, but at the expense of third parties 
and not at the expense of oneself. In line with the hypothesis, 
Chapter 5 showed that guilt does motivate prosocial behavior 
towards others at the expense of oneself in dyadic situations, but 
that guilt motivates prosocial behavior towards the hurt person at 
the expense of others in multiple-person situations. After a guilt 
experience, participants acted prosocially towards the hurt person 
at the expense of oneself compared to participants without a guilt 
experience. But this only happened in dyadic situations 
(Experiment 5.1). In multiple-person situations, guilt motivated 
participants to act prosocially towards the hurt person at the 
expense of a third party present and not at the expense of 
themselves (Experiment 5.2). This finding was replicated when 
possible outcomes were explicitly contrasted (Experiment 5.3), 
and when the third party was a charity (Experiment 5.4). Finally, 
Experiment 5.5 showed that, after having hurt another person in 
the lab, participants neglected the well-being of third persons only 
in situations where the hurt other was present. These findings 
suggest that the prosocial effects of the moral emotion guilt are 
limited to dyadic situations and to situations where it is not 
possible to repair the damage (i.e., exogenously). What are the 
implications and contributions of the findings reported in these four 
chapters?  
 
 
Implications and Contributions 
 
The present dissertation reports the first systematic empirical 
investigations of the behavioral effects of the moral emotions 
shame and guilt. Together, these investigations contribute to the 
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understanding of shame and guilt in particular and of moral 
emotions in general. In addition, they have implications for 
research on impact of emotions on decision making and behavior.  
 
Insights in shame, guilt, and moral emotions 
 
The findings constitute a first step toward an understanding of the 
ways in which shame influences motivations and behavior. Due to 
different theories with contrasting predictions, shame seemed to 
be a very complicated emotion. According to theories on moral 
emotions, shame would motivate a focus on the well-being of 
others and of society, and would therefore motivate prosocial 
behavior (Frank, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Smith, 1759). In contrast, 
emotion theories on shame stated that shame would motivate a 
focus on the self and would therefore motivate hiding and 
withdrawal behaviors (M. Lewis, 2003; Tangney, 1991, 1999). The 
present dissertation clearly shows when and why shame motivates 
seemingly contrasting behaviors, and with the results it appears 
that shame is not such a complicated emotion at all. Shame arises 
after a moral transgression or incompetence, and instigates a 
negative evaluation about the whole self. As a consequence, 
people want to restore their positive self. They do this by 
approaching performance and achievement opportunities, and 
when they interact with audience from the shame event, they act 
prosocially towards those people. Only when it is too risky or not 
possible to restore their self, people revert to withdrawal or 
avoidance behaviors in order to protect themselves from further 
possible damage. This view shows that shame is indeed a moral 
emotion that can motivate prosocial behavior, and should not be 
viewed as an ugly emotion with only negative consequences.  
 
The current findings are also an important addition to what is 
known about the effects of guilt. Just like shame, guilt was 
perceived as a moral emotion benefiting the well-being of others 
and of society (Frank, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Smith, 1759). In support 
of these theories, Ketelaar and Au (2003) and Nelissen et al. 
(2007) showed that guilt motivates prosocial behavior towards 
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unknown others in dyadic situations. But emotion theories on guilt 
stated that guilt would motivate a preoccupation with the 
transgression, resulting in reparative behaviors towards the hurt 
person (Baumeister et al., 1994; H. B. Lewis, 1987). The chapters 
in this dissertation show what happens after a guilt experience, 
and how guilt can motivate prosocial behavior towards society and 
reparative behavior towards the hurt person. When people 
experience guilt, they have hurt another person and are motivated 
to repair this hurt. If they find themselves subsequently in 
situations where the hurt other is not present, they act prosocially 
towards every person they encounter. But if they find themselves 
in situations together with that hurt person, they act prosocially 
towards the hurt person at the expense of others they encounter, 
and avoid as much as possible costs for themselves. This view 
shows that guilt indeed is a moral emotion motivating prosocial 
behavior and reparative behavior, but that there is a limit to its 
positive and adaptive effects. 
 
Considering the present findings, what can be said about the 
status of shame and guilt as moral emotions? Theories on moral 
emotions seem to suggest that moral emotions motivate prosocial 
or cooperative behaviors in every situation towards every person 
in one’s surrounding (Smith, 1759). The results of Chapters 2 and 
3 show that shame does motivate prosocial behaviors towards 
audience of the shame event or in situations related to the shame 
event, but not towards people in situations unrelated to the shame 
event. Similarly, the results of Chapter 2 and 5 show that guilt 
does motivate prosocial behavior towards everybody when the 
hurt person is not present, but only prosocial behavior towards the 
hurt person at the expense of third others when the hurt person is 
present. In my view, this does not mean that shame and guilt can 
no longer be seen as moral emotions. After all, both shame and 
guilt are shown to inhibit selfish tendencies in favor of behaviors 
that benefit people who have been wronged or who have seen 
one’s actions. In that sense, the studies in this dissertation 
underline the view of shame and guilt as commitment devices. 
However, the results do show that moral emotions should not be 
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seen as processes that generate positive outcomes for every 
person in one’s surrounding and in every situation. If anything, the 
present dissertation shows that a thorough understanding of the 
experiential and motivational elements of moral emotions is 
necessary to fully grasp how they function in interpersonal 
relationships. This dissertation is the first step towards such a 
more complete understanding of moral emotions. 
 
Consequences for emotion research 
 
This dissertation not only provides information about shame, guilt 
and moral emotions that is essential for a better understanding of 
these phenomena, it also gives valuable information and directions 
for research on emotions in general. First of all, the findings show 
that a focus on the experiential contents of discrete emotions is 
necessary for a complete understanding of how emotions 
influence decision making and behavior. As discussed in Chapter 
1, most emotion research is based on the valence approach, 
studying differences between effects of positive and negative 
emotions. The valence approach can give insights in how for 
example the effects of happiness and anger may differ (Van Kleef, 
De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). But the current research clearly 
shows that this approach is not the best way to gain a complete 
understanding of behavioral effects of emotions. Different negative 
emotions can have different effects on decision making and 
behavior, even when they are such resembling negative emotions 
as shame and guilt. For example, guilt is shown to motivate a 
person to act prosocially towards unknown others, but shame 
does not have such an effect. Only when one makes a distinction 
between distinct emotions and takes a close look at the 
experiential elements of a specific emotion, it is possible to fully 
understand how emotions work and to predict how people will act.  
 
Second, the present dissertation shows that a distinction between 
exogenous and endogenous influences of emotions is essential in 
emotion research. Previous research has made this distinction 
theoretically (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006), but most scholars do 
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not take this distinction into account when empirically studying the 
effects of emotions. Indeed, the previous chapters are the first 
systematic study on exogenous and endogenous influences of 
specific emotions. As a consequence, scholars may find different 
or even contrasting results depending on the used methods, and 
subsequently may draw incorrect conclusions about the effects, 
goal or function of an emotion. For example, if I had only 
measured behaviors following shame in events unrelated to the 
shame experience, I would have wrongly concluded that shame 
has no effect on behavior. And if I had measured prosocial 
behavior following guilt only in situations where the hurt person is 
not present, I would at this moment still think that guilt is an 
emotion with only adaptive and positive consequences. It thus 
appears essential that in all areas of research where emotions are 
studied, the distinction and consequences of exogenous and 
endogenous influences of emotions are taken into account.  
 
A third and last implication of this dissertation for emotion research 
is the extension of focus towards multiple-person situations. In the 
last couple of years, more and more scholars have focused on 
interpersonal effects of emotions. Because many decisions and 
behaviors take place in situations with other people present, this is 
an important development in emotion research. However, most, if 
not all, of these studies have concentrated on situations in which 
the person is alone or together with one other person (e.g., Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2004), while in daily life we often 
interact with multiple persons at the same time. The present 
research has shown that the study of dyadic situations may give 
only a limited perspective on effects of emotions and may not 
capture the full picture. For example, using dyadic situations to 
study prosocial effects of guilt led to the conclusion that guilt has 
only adaptive consequences. This conclusion was only changed 
when I started studying prosocial effects of guilt in three-person 
situations, revealing that guilt has a dark side as well. So the role 
of emotions in decision making and behavior cannot be fully 
understood merely by focusing on effects of emotions in dyadic 
situations, and a broader approach using multiple-person 
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situations is needed. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What do people do after having fallen over in a dance 
competition? What will you do when you have made your friend 
fall over and have made him end last in his competition? These 
questions seemed hard to answer at the beginning of our journey. 
Shame looked like an ugly and complicated emotion, and it 
seemed impossible to predict what people do after such an 
experience. Guilt appeared as a much simpler emotion, motivating 
prosocial behavior towards everybody. But these impressions 
have changed along the way. By concentrating on the experiential 
elements of shame and guilt, and by taking a close look at the 
situations in which these emotions influence behavior, this 
dissertation has taken a step towards a more complete 
understanding of these two important emotions. We now know that 
you will probably act prosocially towards the top dancers who have 
seen your fall, and will try again in a next dance competition to 
show that you are a good Latin dancer. And this dissertation has 
shown us that after having made your friend fall down, you will 
probably take him to dinner and cinema at your mother’s 
expenses, even though you have an appointment that evening 
with your grandfather. Perhaps this knowledge not only helps 
research, but also helps us to understand why we and our 
relatives act the way we do.  
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Samenvatting 
 (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Emoties spelen een belangrijke rol in het dagelijks leven. Ze 
beïnvloeden wat we voelen en denken, hoe we ons gedragen en 
welke beslissingen we nemen. Een gebied waar emoties mogelijk 
een grote rol spelen is sociaal gedrag. Wetenschappers hebben 
zich vaak afgevraagd waarom mensen zich prosociaal gedragen 
en coöpereren in dagelijkse situaties. De huidige dissertatie 
probeert inzicht te krijgen in waarom en wanneer mensen zich 
prosociaal gedragen door te kijken naar twee zeer 
interpersoonlijke emoties: schaamte en schuld. Er bestaan vele 
theorieën over wat schaamte en schuld zijn en in welke situaties 
ze gevoeld worden (bv. Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; H. B. Lewis, 
1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Fischer, 1995) maar het is tot 
op heden onduidelijk hoe deze emoties gedrag beïnvloeden.  
 
Voornamelijk economische theorieën zien schaamte en schuld als 
behorende tot de groep van morele emoties, emoties die 
verbonden zijn met het welzijn van anderen en met de 
samenleving als geheel (Haidt, 2003). Wanneer mensen zich in 
situaties bevinden waarin onmiddellijke zelfbelangen en lange 
termijn coöperatie met elkaar conflicteren, bieden morele emoties 
een oplossing door de zelfzuchtige optie minder aantrekkelijk te 
maken (Frank, 1988). Met andere woorden, volgens deze 
redenering zouden schaamte en schuld prosociaal gedrag 
stimuleren.  
 
In de emotieliteratuur worden schaamte en schuld meer als aparte 
emoties met verschillende gedragseffecten gezien. Schaamte is 
een zeer pijnlijke en destructieve emotie die ontstaat na een 
morele transgressie of incompetentie (Gilbert, 1997; Fessler, 
2004). Mensen hebben een sociale of morele norm geschonden 
en dit gedrag generaliseert zich naar het gehele zelfbeeld (Izard, 
1997; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Schaamte zou negatieve 
invloeden op gedrag hebben: de emotie zou sociaal ontwijkgedrag 
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en terugtrekking motiveren en interpersoonlijke relaties 
beschadigen (Dickerson & Gruenewald, 2004; Tangney, 1999). 
Schuld wordt in de emotieliteratuur meer positief gezien. Deze 
emotie ontstaat na een morele transgressie waarin een ander 
persoon pijn is gedaan (Izard, 1977). Als gevolg hiervan zijn 
mensen gericht op het leed dat ze de ander hebben aangedaan 
(Baumeister et al., 1994). Schuld zou verontschuldigingen en 
acties gericht op het goedmaken motiveren (Caplovitz Barrett, 
1995; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984).  
 
Samengevat, verschillende theorieën leiden tot verschillende 
voorspellingen over gedragingen die schaamte en schuld 
motiveren. Empirisch onderzoek kan ook geen antwoord geven op 
de vraag welke gedragingen volgen op schaamte en schuld 
aangezien er nauwelijks studies bestaan die gedrag na schaamte 
of schuld hebben gemeten. In deze dissertatie maak ik gebruik 
van een pragmatische aanpak om een beter begrip te krijgen van 
schaamte en schuld en laat ik meerdere empirische studies naar 
de gedragseffecten van schaamte en schuld zien. Ik ga uit van de 
feeling-is-for-doing approach (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006), waarin 
negatieve emoties worden gezien als signalen dat doelen niet 
bereikt worden en als motivatoren voor gedrag dat helpt doelen te 
bereiken. De feeling-is-for-doing approach maakt ook onderscheid 
tussen endogene en exogene invloeden van emoties. Endogene 
invloeden van emoties zijn een integraal deel van inspanningen 
om doelen te bereiken en zijn relevant voor beslissingen die 
gemaakt worden. Exogene invloeden van emoties zijn extern aan 
inspanningen om doelen te bereiken en zijn niet gerelateerd aan 
huidige beslissingen. Dit onderscheid tussen exogene en 
endogene invloeden speelt een belangrijke rol bij de studie van 
gedragseffecten van schaamte en schuld.  
 
Wanneer schaamte op deze pragmatische manier bekeken wordt, 
blijkt dat schaamte het probleem van een beschadigd zelfbeeld 
signaleert. Omdat mensen een fundamentele behoefte hebben om 
een positief zelfbeeld te hebben, is het doel van schaamte met dit 
beschadigd zelfbeeld om te gaan. Ik stel voor dat schaamte 
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voornamelijk toenaderingsgedrag motiveert om het zelfbeeld te 
herstellen, en wanneer dit niet mogelijk of te risicovol is, schaamte 
ontwijkgedrag motiveert om het zelfbeeld te beschermen voor nog 
meer gevaar. Omdat dit toenaderingsgedrag de functie van 
schaamte reflecteert, stel ik voor dat toenaderingsgedrag en 
prosociaal gedrag verschijnen wanneer endogene invloeden van 
schaamte bestudeerd worden. Echter, wanneer exogene 
invloeden van schaamte bestudeerd worden, zullen geen 
gedragseffecten gevonden worden. De persoon heeft namelijk al 
op de schaamte gereageerd door de dreigende schaamtesituatie 
te verlaten.  
 
Wanneer schuld door ogen van de feeling-is-for-doing approach 
bekeken wordt, blijkt dat schuld het probleem van een 
beschadigde relatie signaleert. Het doel van schuld is dan de 
beschadigde relatie te verbeteren. Wanneer de pijngedane ander 
aanwezig is (dat wil zeggen endogene invloeden van schuld) is de 
verwachting dat schuld prosociaal gedrag richting de pijngedane 
ander motiveert ten koste van andere aanwezigen. Echter, 
wanneer de pijngedane ander niet aanwezig is (dat wil zeggen 
exogene invloeden van schuld), is het niet mogelijk de schade te 
herstellen. Ik stel voor dat in deze situaties schuld generaliseert 
naar een algemene motivatie om relaties te verbeteren en 
prosociaal gedrag richting anderen motiveert. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt eerst gekeken naar exogene invloeden van 
schaamte en schuld op prosociaal gedrag. Motiveren schaamte en 
schuld je prosociaal te gedragen in situaties die ongerelateerd zijn 
aan de schaamte- of schuldsituatie? De verwachting was dat 
schuld prosociaal gedrag zou motiveren richting derden omdat de 
pijngedane ander niet aanwezig was. Voor schaamte was de 
verwachting dat er geen effecten op prosociaal gedrag zouden zijn 
omdat de dreigende situatie al verlaten was. Inderdaad, twee 
experimenten laten zien dat exogene schuld prosociaal gedrag 
motiveert voor prozelvers, maar dat exogene schaamte geen 
invloed op prosociaal gedrag heeft. Proefpersonen die schuld 
ervoeren gedroegen zich prosocialer richting mensen die niets van 
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de schuldsituatie afwisten, maar proefpersonen die schaamte 
ervoeren gedroegen zich niet prosocialer richting mensen die niets 
van de schaamtesituatie afwisten. Deze bevindingen suggereren 
dat schaamte geen prosociaal gedrag motiveert terwijl het wel als 
een morele emotie gezien wordt. Betekent dit dat schaamte geen 
morele emotie is? 
 
Deze vraag wordt in Hoofdstuk 3 beantwoord, waarin exogene en 
endogene effecten van schaamte op prosociaal gedrag 
bestudeerd worden. Heeft schaamte wel effect op gedrag in 
situaties die gerelateerd zijn aan de schaamtesituatie en waarin 
dus de dreiging van een beschadigd zelfbeeld nog steeds actief 
is? Vijf experimenten laten zien dat endogene schaamte 
prosociaal gedrag motiveert voor prozelvers, maar dat exogene 
schaamte geen effect op prosociaal gedrag heeft. Proefpersonen 
die schaamte ervoeren gedroegen zich prosocialer richting 
mensen die de schaamtesituatie gezien hadden dan richting 
mensen die niets van de schaamtesituatie afwisten en dan 
proefpersonen die geen schaamte ervoeren. Deze bevindingen 
suggereren dat schaamte naast ontwijkgedrag ook 
toenaderingsgedrag kan motiveren. Hoe kan schaamte zulk 
tegengesteld gedrag motiveren?  
 
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt aandacht geschonken aan de motivaties van 
schaamte om de vraag te beantwoorden hoe schaamte 
ontwijkgedrag en toenaderingsgedrag kan motiveren. De 
hypothese was dat mensen die schaamte ervaren voornamelijk 
toenaderingsgedrag vertonen om het beschadigd zelfbeeld te 
herstellen, maar dat wanneer dit niet mogelijk of te risicovol is, 
ontwijkgedrag vertonen om het beschadigd zelfbeeld te 
beschermen voor nog meer schade. Vijf studies laten inderdaad 
zien dat schaamte een herstelmotivatie en een beschermmotivatie 
heeft en dat deze motivaties het toenaderingsgedrag voorspellen 
dat op schaamte volgt.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 5 schuift de aandacht terug naar schuld. Nu we 
weten dat de morele emoties schaamte en schuld beiden 
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prosociaal gedrag motiveren, rijst de vraag: tot hoever reikt dit 
effect? Motiveert schuld prosociaal gedrag richting iedereen in 
elke situatie? De voorspelling was dat door de eenzijdige 
aandacht voor het goedmaken met de pijngedane ander, schuld in 
situaties met meerdere anderen enkel prosociaal gedrag richting 
de pijngedane ander zou motiveren ten koste van derden. 
Overeenkomstig de hypothese laten vijf experimenten zien dat 
schuld prosociaal gedrag motiveert ten koste van anderen en niet 
ten koste van zichzelf. Proefpersonen die zich schuldig voelden 
gedroegen zich socialer richting de pijngedane ander en minder 
sociaal richting derden dan proefpersonen die geen schuld 
ervoeren en dan proefpersonen die in situaties waren waar de 
pijngedane ander niet aanwezig was.  
 
De huidige dissertatie is de eerste stap richting een beter begrip 
van schaamte en schuld. Voor schaamte is nu duidelijk dat deze 
emotie prosociaal gedrag richting publiek van de schaamtesituatie 
motiveert en dat het twee motivaties heeft die ontwijkgedrag en 
toenaderingsgedrag voorspellen. Voor schuld is nu duidelijk dat de 
emotie prosociaal gedrag richting anderen motiveert wanneer de 
pijngedane ander niet aanwezig is, maar derden beschadigt 
wanneer de pijngedane ander wel aanwezig is. Deze resultaten 
laten zien dat schaamte en schuld wel als morele emoties gezien 
kunnen worden omdat ze prosociaal gedrag kunnen motiveren, 
maar dat een nuancering van gedragseffecten van morele emoties 
noodzakelijk is. Door een duidelijk begrip van de experiëntiële en 
motivationele aspecten van schaamte en schuld is het mogelijk 
volledig te begrijpen hoe morele emoties functioneren in 
interpersoonlijke relaties.  
 
Deze dissertatie geeft niet alleen informatie over schaamte, schuld 
en morele emoties, maar geeft ook waardevolle informatie en 
richting aan emotieonderzoek in het algemeen. Het huidige 
onderzoek laat zien dat gedragseffecten van emoties enkel 
volledig begrepen kunnen worden wanneer alle experiëntiële en 
motivationele aspecten van een specifieke emotie bekeken 
worden. Daarnaast laat deze dissertatie zien dat een onderscheid 
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tussen exogene en endogene invloeden van emoties essentieel is 
in emotieonderzoek. Exogene en endogene invloeden hebben 
verschillende effecten op gedrag en wanneer slechts één van 
deze invloeden bestudeerd wordt is het mogelijk een incompleet 
beeld van een emotie te krijgen. Tenslotte blijkt dat een studie van 
enkel dyadische situaties een gelimiteerd perspectief kan geven 
op emoties. In het dagelijks leven interacteren we vaak 
tegelijkertijd met verschillende mensen, dus een uitbreiding naar 
meerdere-persoonssituaties zal een waardevolle toevoeging aan 
de huidige kennis over emoties geven. En inderdaad, enkel door 
toevoeging van al deze elementen is het nu mogelijk het gedrag 
van vrienden en familie te begrijpen wanneer ze schaamte of 
schuld ervaren.  
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